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PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT AFfER PALAZZOLO 
JAMES S. BURLING* 
Abstract: With the ascendancy of environmentalism in American law 
has come a renewed focus on private property rights. That in turn has 
rekindled the debate over whether our ability to use private property is 
a fundamental right rather than an essentially revocable right that 
derives from the government. This debate was recently played out in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island where the United States Supreme Court 
addressed several elements of regulatory takings doctrine: When is a 
claim against government ripe? Does an acquirer of already regulated 
property have the same rights to challenge the regulation and bring a 
takings claims as the owner at the time the regulations were adopted? 
Whether there can be a regulatory taking if some use and value remains 
in the property, albeit a greatly diminished use and value, or if use and 
value is diminished on only a portion of a property. 
This Article focuses on these questions in light of the Supreme 
Court's holdings in Palazzolo, as potentially modified in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. Attention will 
be focused on the role that environmental protection concerns play in 
determining whether a regulation constitutes a regulatory taking, 
including a discussion of wetlands and the public trust doctrine. 
* Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF). PLF is a nonprofit public interest legal 
foundation with offices in Sacramento, CA; Anchorage, AK; Bellevue, WA; Miami, FL; and 
Honolulu, HI. For more information, visit PLF's website at http://www.pacificlegal.org 
and http://www.aboutpalazzolo.com.Mr. Burling argued on behalf of Anthony Palazzolo 
before the United States Supreme Court. 
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[A]nd it is not without reason that [man] seeks out and is willing to join 
in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for 
others· who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual 
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general 
name "property. ''1 
[It] is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules 
whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and what Actions 
he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is 
it men call Propriety. 2 
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bun-
dle.3 
INTRODUCTION 
The battle over property rights in America has rekindled an age-
old debate: whether our legal system is based upon the assumption 
that man uses and has dominion over property for his own benefit, 
limited only by the proviso that no harm is done to the public, or 
whether property can be put to private beneficial use only with the 
consent of the sovereign, and that "private" property is held subject to 
an inchoate trust for larger societal interests. In the traditional 
American view, the former philosophy has held sway over the latter: 
property is seen to be not only an economic boon, but a key ingredi-
ent of American liberty-where individual rights are sacrosanct over 
the needs of the group. But there are those who are uncomfortable 
with this view and who suggest it is an anachronism in this Age of the 
Environment.4 Because any use of any property has some measurable, 
or at least some spiritual, environmental effect, critics advocate the 
adoption of a legal philosophy that would make the use and owner-
ship of property subject to common consent. These advocates point to 
riparian property as a model. Aquatic resources such as riparian land 
and wetlands are already to some degree imbued with public con-
cerns, and may arguably be subject to navigational servitudes, the 
public trust doctrine, and even, some suggest, the law of custom. 
Those in favor of greater state intervention in the use of property wish 
1 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise o/Civil Government § 123, at 184, in Two TREATISES OF 
GoVERNMENT (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (1690). 
2 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN ch. 18, at 234 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin 
Books 1968) (1651). 
3 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). 
4 See generally, e.g.,Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy o/Nature: Understanding 
Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433 (1993). 
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to strengthen such public rights in aquatic resources and expand 
their application to dry land. Those who argue in favor of greater re-
spect for individual property rights emphasize the limitations on such 
public rights in aquatic resources, and emphasize that whatever public 
rights may exist should be strictly confined to riparian lands. Thus, it 
is often over aquatic resources that the battle between the competing 
visions of property is most keenly fought. The case of Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island' may be the most significant skirmish in this war in many 
years-and one that firmly rejects the vision of property as a state de-
rived benefit that can be altered at will by the State.6 
When John Locke first described the fundamental nature of 
property as being those rights and liberties that predate sovereign 
power, he pointedly noted that the sovereign's primary duty is to pro-
tect the property of the people. When the sovereign fails in this duty, 
the legitimacy of the sovereign is called into question.7 This view 
stands in marked contrast to the competing absolutist philosophy of 
government of his day, best known today through the work of Thomas 
Hobbes. Hobbes believed that because no man had security in prop-
erty before such rights were surrendered to a powerful sovereign, all 
claims to liberty and property can be fulfilled only at the sufferance of 
that sovereign.8 
Indisputably, having had their fill with one absolute sovereign, 
the Framers of the Constitution were firmly predisposed to the phi-
losophy of Locke and were very much aware of the need to preserve 
5533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
6 Subsequent to the writing of this Article, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. u Tahoe Regional Planning Agrmry, 122 S. Ct. 1465 
(2002), which held in a self-described "narrow" decision that a development moratorium 
that temporarily deprives an owner of all use of property does not constitute a categorical 
temporary regulatory taking because some value remained and because there was no 
physical invasion. See Id. at 1470 (noting that the opinion is of "narrow scope"); id. at 1484 
(rejecting categorical rule). 
7 LOCKE, supra note 1, § 201, at 224, § 222, at 233-34. Lock explained: "Whenever the 
legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the peopk, . . . they put themselves 
into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any further obedi-
ence .... " Id. § 222, at 233 (emphasis added). 
8 See grmerally HOBBES, supra note 2, at ch. 13-19, at 183-239. In contrast to Locke's 
"war with the people," Hobbes wrote: "[W] ithout a common Power to keep them all in awe 
[i.e. government], they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is 
of every man against every man .... And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short." Id. ch. 13, at 185-86. Thus, it is "necessary[] to lay down this right to all things; and 
be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himselfe." Id. ch. 14, at 190 (emphasis omitted). 
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rights in property.9 Indeed, our Constitution was but the latest mani-
festation of the long-standing natural law understanding that an indi-
vidual's property should not be taken without compensation.10 Thus, 
under the Lockean theory of government, which underpins our Con-
stitution, property is an individual right derived from the labor of in-
dividuals.ll It is inherently possessed by the people, and not born of 
government largesse-whether the property be money, real estate, or 
another manifestation. 
Prodded by the United States Supreme Court, the lower federal 
and state courts have become increasingly attentive to the plight of 
property owners as they are confronted with increasing governmental 
regulation. These courts have begun to award significant monetary 
damages for "regulatory takings" of property.12 Nevertheless, the 
9 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 315 (1996) (stating that Madison "regarded all decisions of eco-
nomic policy as implicating questions of justice and thus of private rights"). 
10 See id. at 314 (asserting that Madison's "concern about the security of private rights 
was rooted in a palpable fear that economic legislation was jeopardizing fundamental 
rights of property"). See, e.g., 2 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS, ch. XIV, § VII (Wil-
liam Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press. 1853) ("When ownership, or any other right, 
has been legitimately acquired by anyone, that it may not be taken away from him without 
cause, is a matter of Natural Law."). See generally, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001); This natural law 
tradition of preserving property against the sovereign is reflected throughout the Conti-
nental and British legal tradition. Furthermore, when property is taken "by the Force of 
Eminent Dominion, there is required ... public utility ... and ... if possible, compensa-
tion ... at the common expense." Id. See also WIUJAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ch. 1, § III, at 135 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001) (1783) ("So great 
moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least 
violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community ... [unless] by 
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained."). 
11 LOCKE, supra note 1, §§ 28-51, at 134-46. While this description is admittedly a sim-
plistic gloss of a theory of property rights, it is important for anyone dealing with a prop-
erty rights argument to have a basic understanding of the fundamentals of that right. This 
could be especially relevant when arguing that something on the outer limits of property 
rights theory is or is not a protected property right. 
From Hobbes to Locke to Marx to Nozick, many individuals have proposed new theo-
ries on the relationships between property and society. There are more recent writings on 
property theory available to the interested reader. See generally, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, AN-
ARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (providing a libertarian approach that augments 
Locke's labor theory with a historical expectations theory); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND 
FREEDOM (1999); SIEGAN, supra note 10 (tracing the history of property rights in the law); 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "just 
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). 
12 See generally, e.g., City ofMontereyv. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (uphold-
ing award of $1.45 million for the temporary taking of 37.5 acres of oceanfront property); 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding $2.6 
million damage award for wetlands takings); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 
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trend toward increased government regulation of property shows lit-
tle sign of abating. Government regulators continually question the 
existence of a vibrant Lockean tradition in defining property rights, 
often arguing that rights do not become actualized until the govern-
ment grants an irrevocable permit.13 Among government regulators 
and allied environmental groups, substantial efforts are underway to 
distinguish, diminish, and otherwise divert the takings "threat. "14 The 
doctrine of regulatory takings is also evolving; with each major deci-
sion from the United States Supreme Court, landowners, government 
agencies, and the lower courts attempt to understand the implications 
and apply that decision to regulatory actions.I5 Also, with each new 
decision, a host of additional questions is raised. 
On June 28, 2001, the Court issued a significant chapter in the 
saga of regulatory takings with Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.I6 Palazzolo ad-
dressed three issues that have been bedeviling the litigation of regula-
tory takings: When is a takings claim ripe? When does notice of a pre-
existing regulation destroy the right to challenge the application of 
that regulation? And how much use and value may a regulation de-
stroy before compensation is due.J7 This Article shall address each of 
these issues in light of the decision in Palazzolo. 
F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (awarding $60 million, plus interest, for taking of coal deposit); 
Cooley v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (2000) (awarding $2,065,200.42, plus interest, for 
taking of thirty-three acres); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999) 
(awarding $752,444, plus interest, from the date of taking); E. Minerals Int'l., Inc. v. 
United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 621 (1997) (awarding $19.6 million for loss ofleasehold interest 
in coal deposit), judgment 71!V'd, appeal dismissed sub nom. Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 
1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. E. Minerals Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 
1960 (2002). 
IS This is reflected, for example, in modern due process jurisprudence where some 
courts hold that no due process protection attaches until a permit is vested. See, e.g., Tri-
omphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d 198,203 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the 
right must be vested for due process to attach); RRI Realty Corp., v. Inc. Vill. of South-
hampton, 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1989). But see DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F. 
3d 592 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that ownership of property gives rise to due process 
protection) . 
14See, e.g., Website of Environmental Policy Project, at http://www.envpoly.org/index. 
htm. 
15 See Policy Guide on Takings: Land Use Regulations and the "Takings" Challenge 
(2001), at http://www.plannings.org/policyguides/takings.html (discussing how "takings" 
doctrine is evolving law). 
16 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
17 [d. at 607-09. 
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I. PALAZZOLO: BACKGROUND OF LOWER STATE COURT OPINION AND 
GRANT OF CERTIORARI 
For over forty years, Anthony Palazzolo owned, directly or indi-
rectly, a valuable parcel of property in the ocean resort town of West-
erly, Rhode Island,18 Shore Gardens, Inc. (Shore Gardens), acquired 
the property in 1959 and 1960. Mr. Palazzolo became the sole owner 
of Shore Gardens in 1960. The property consists of roughly eighteen 
acres of wetlands and a small indeterminate amount of uplands. The 
land was divided into seventy-four parcels in two subdivision map 
filings that occurred in 1936 and 1959. Just north of the property is 
Winnapaug Pond, an intertidal pond with an outlet to the Atlantic 
Ocean. According to the state's biologist, "[lland uses of Winnapaug 
Pond/Atlantic Beach area are moderate-to-heavy density seasonal de-
velopment, residential and commercial; development directly adja-
cent to this site is moderate density seasonal dwellings. "19 At the time 
of his application, the vicinity of Mr. Palazzolo's property was devel-
oped with vacation homes, mostly on the northern, western, and east-
ern boundaries of the pond and along the neighboring ocean 
beach.20 Mr. Palazzolo's property is bisected by a gravel road and there 
are several homes in the immediate vicinity; the road and homes were 
built on fill prior to the 1970s. Like the neighboring homes, the only 
way to develop Mr. Palazzolo's land is to raise the grade with fill.21 
In 1971, the Rhode Island Legislature authorized the Coastal Re-
sources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate the filling of 
coastal wetlands.22 The CRMC promulgated regulations requiring that 
any filling of coastal salt marsh, such as that found on Mr. Palazzolo's 
property, meet certain public interest requirements.23 For example, 
Section 130(A) of the Coastal Resources Management Plan (CRMP) 
states: 
18 For a more complete rendition of the facts with citations to the record, the reader is 
invited to examine the briefs. These facts are derived from Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, 
2000 WL 1742033, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047) [hereinaf-
ter Petitioner's Brief on the Merits]. 
19 Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, Biologist's Field Report, reprinted inJoint Appendix at 
21, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047). 
20 Pala:t.zolo, 533 U.S. at 613. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 606. 
2~ See Miller v. Coastal Res. Mgmt., C.A. No. PC 89-2726, 1991 WL 789931, at *3 n.3 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1991). 
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Special exceptions may be granted ... only if and when the 
applicant has demonstrated that: 
(1) The proposed activity serves a compelling public purpose 
which provides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to indi-
vidual or private interests. The activity must be one or more of 
the following: (a) an activity associated with public infra-
structure such as utility, energy, communications, transporta-
tion facilities; (b) a water-dependent activity that generates 
substantial economic gain to the state; and/or (c) an activity 
that provides access to the shore for broad segments of the 
public. 24 
7 
Tellingly, the CRMC has ruled that private housing, and even low-
income public housing, does not meet this public interest require-
ment.25 
Prior to the adoption of this regulatory regime, Mr. Palazzolo ap-
plied twice to utilize the property, in 1963 and in 1966, to the De-
partment of Natural Resources (DNR) seeking permission to dredge 
Winnapaug Pond in order to develop the property. The State ap-
proved both applications in April of 1971, finding that neither appli-
cation would "'have any significant effect on wildlife. "'26 Shortly 
thereafter, however, the State withdrew the approval, and Mr. Palaz-
zolo did not appeal,27 
Mr. Palazzolo had an interest in the property through the 1960s 
and early 1970s as the sole shareholder of Shore Gardens. Eventually, 
Mr. Palazzolo let the corporation lapse, and its charter was revoked in 
1978. At this point, the property "pass[ed] by operation of law to 
Palazzolo, its sole shareholder. ''28 
Mter that time, Mr. Palazzolo, now as the owner of the property 
in his individual capacity, twice more applied for permits to CRMC to 
fill the property. The first application, filed in 1983, like the one filed 
in 1963, was to fill approximately eighteen acres of the property.29 U n-
like the original applications, this involved no dredging. Mr. Palazzolo 
24 See id. (emphasis added) . 
25 See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 18, at *5. 
16 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, CA. No. 86-1496, 1995 WI.. 941370, at *3 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995) (quoting the decision of the Rhode Island Department of 
Natural Resources). 
27 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614 (2001). 
28 Palazzolo v. State ex rei. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'll in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
29 Id. at 711. 
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expected that approval of this application would allow him to proceed 
with the development of homes on the seventy-four lots that had been 
previously subdivided, although the 1983 application was only for the 
preliminary step of filling the wetlands, not the development of 
homes.3o CRMC denied this application on July 12, 1984, and Mr. 
Palazzolo did not appeal the denia1.31 
In 1985 Mr. Palazzolo applied to fill 11.4 acres; like his 1966 ap-
plication to DNR, he intended to prepare the site to make it suitable 
for a family beach recreational area. The plan called for the construc-
tion of a fifty-car parking lot with room for boat trailers and the provi-
sion of picnic tables, concrete barbecue pits, and portable toilets.32 
This plan was rejected in 1986. CRMC found that, in its natural state, 
Mr. Palazzolo's property provided the public benefits of "refuge and 
feeding areas for larval and juvenile finfish and shellfish and for mi-
gratory waterfowl and wading birds," "access of [f]auna ... to cover 
areas," and that the property facilitates "the exchange of nutri-
ent/waste products," and allows "sediment trapping," "flood storage," 
and "nutrient retention. "33 
Furthermore, the proposal failed to meet various regulatory cri-
teria outlined in CRMC's CRMP regulations. For example, it found 
that Mr. Palazzolo's beach club was in "conflict" with CRMP Section 
130(A) (1) because the proposed beach club did not serve "a compel-
ling public purpose which provides benefits to the public as a whole 
as opposed to individual or private interests."34 Mr. Palazzolo unsuc-
cessfully appealed the denial of the permit. 35 
Based on the four denials over the span of twenty-three years, Mr. 
Palazzolo sued in 1988 for inverse condemnation, alleging that the 
property had a net value of $3,150,000. The trial court ruled against 
Mr. Palazzolo and the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's decision.36 The court's first ground for affirming the trial 
court decision was that Mr. Palazzolo's claim was not ripe because he 
failed to apply for "less ambitious development plans. "37 It found that 
30 Id. at 714. 
81 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614-15; Tavares, 746 A.2d at 71l. 
32 Tavares, 746 A.2d at 71l. 
33 See Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, Decision on the Petition of Anthony Palazzolo, re-
printed in Joint Appendix at 27, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-
2047). 
84 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615 (quoting CRMP § 130(A) (1». 
85Id. at 616. 
'!o6Id. 
87 Tavares, 746A.2d at 714. 
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the 1963 and 1983 applications sought to fill the entire eighteen acres 
of wetlands and (mistakenly) that the beach club applications sought 
to "fill all of the wetlands except for a fifty-foot strip. "38 The court 
concluded that Mr. Palazzolo should have filed another application to 
fill fewer acres of wetlands or to utilize just the upland area of the 
property.39 
The court also provided two other alternative bases for affirming 
the trial court decision.40 It held that because Mr. Palazzolo acquired 
the property in 1978 by virtue of the dissolution of Shore Gardens,41 
he had acquired the property after the adoption of the regulations 
restricting the filling of wetlands and thus "had no reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations. "42 Put another way, "the right to fill wet-
lands was not part of the title he acquired. "43 
The court also found that Mr. Palazzolo "had not been deprived 
of all beneficial use of his property" because had he developed the 
upland portion of the land he could have realized some value from 
the property (approximately $200,000 compared to Palazzolo's esti-
mate of a $3.1 million net value).44 Alternatively, he could have real-
ized "value in the amount of $157,000 as an open-space gift."45 
On October 10, 2000, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on three questions: 
1. Whether a regulatory takings claim is categorically barred 
whenever the enactment of the regulation predates the 
claimant's acquisition of the property. 
2. Where a land-use agency has authoritatively denied a par-
ticular use of the property and the owner alleges that such 
denial per se constitutes a regulatory taking, whether the 
owner must file additional applications seeking permission 
for "less ambitious uses" in order to ripen the takings claim. 
58 ld. In fact, the beach club application sought to fill 11.4 acres. 
~9 ld. 
40 ld. at 714-18. 
41 ld. at 716. 
42 ld. at 717. 
4~ Tavares, 746 A.2d at 716. 
44 ld. at 711,715. 
451d. at 715. 
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3. Whether the remaining permissible uses of regulated 
property are economically viable merely because the property 
retains a value greater than zero.46 
OnJune 28, 2001, the Court ruled in Mr. Palazzolo's favor on the 
first two issues and rejected his proposed formulation on the third; 
however it also did not accept the State's contention that the remain-
ing use was enough to avoid a taking.47 Instead the Court remanded 
the case back to the Rhode Island courts for further analysis on 
whether· the economic impacts on Mr. Palazzolo's property, when 
weighed against the State's interests, constituted a taking.48 To put 
these questions into proper context, however, it is necessary to first 
address the general parameters of regulatory takings. 
II. THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
The United States Supreme Court has described the basic pur-
pose of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause:49 "The Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. "50 The Court stated 
in Agins v. City of Tiburon: "The application of a general zoning law to 
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests . .. or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land. "51 
The first prong of this test is the takings law analog of a due process 
inquiry-a determination of whether the regulation advances a legiti-
mate governmental interest.52 Most regulations do advance a legiti-
46 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 18, at *i; Tavares, 746 A,2d 707, cert. 
granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000) (mem.). 
47 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001). 
48 [d. 
49 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation."). 
50 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, 
j., dissenting); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,123 (1978) (quot-
ing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960» (alterations in original) (also not-
ing that this is the "principal" rationale for the Takings Clause). 
51 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); accord Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 1987); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127. 
52 In Eide u Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721 (11th Cir. 1990), the court characterized 
takings under the first prong of Agins as "due process takings" claims, as distinguished 
from other types of takings. Unlike straight due process claims, however, the Court in Nol-
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mate governmental interest, although there have been some excep-
tions.53 The parallel between the language of due process and the first 
part of the Agins takings formulation should not be taken as a sign 
that the Agins test is anything but a takings test that, when placed be-
fore a court, deserves the heightened scrutiny that is appropriate in a 
takings analysis. More often than not, the legitimacy of the state inter-
ests is not in question; regulatory goals in a takings case usually fall 
Ian made it clear that a heightened level of scrutiny would apply in the context of a takings 
analysis. See 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. Although the Court has not generally characterized it as 
such, this test creates a categorical rule: if a regulation which injures a property right does 
not advance a legitimate governmental interest there will always be a taking. See Joint Ven-
tures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1990). But see Tampa-Hillsborough 
County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994) (stating that the first 
prong is really a due process issue); but see also Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 
121 F.3d 610, 614 (11th Cir. 1997) (harmonizing the Eleventh Circuit's previous and 
somewhat tortured categorization of takings claims including what it called "due process 
takings claim"). In Villas we now learn that the "Court in recent decisions has likewise 
abandoned the distinction between takings claims and a due process takings theory." But 
see City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (rejecting 
federal amici attempt to revisit this takings test and finding that certain jury instructions 
were consistent with "the requirement that a regulation substantially advance legitimate 
public interests"). 
53 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834,837. Nollan struck down a regulatory fiat which required a 
property owner to give up beach front property in exchange for a building permit. The 
Court found that the requirement was an "out-and-out plan of extortion" and did not ad-
vance a legitimate regulatory goal. Accord Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 398 (1994) 
(finding that Fifth Amendment's nexus requirement calls for "individualized" determina-
tion of "rough proportionality" between condition and impact from land use). There are 
examples of courts striking down a regulation because it did not substantially advance a 
legitimate interest. See Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 
182,195 (1928) (concluding that the taking ofrailroad property for a taxi stand failed to 
advance a legitimate governmental interest); Richardson v. City of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 
1150, 1164 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down a condominium land rent control ordinance 
because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest); Seawall As-
socs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y. 1989) (overturning restrictions 
against converting single-room occupancy hotel rooms). See grmerall:y Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing each reason 
given for a permit denial and finding inadequate justification for the permit denial, lead-
ing to the conclusion that there had been a taking), afl'd, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Manoche-
rian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994) (striking down housing regulation on 
alternate "substantially advance" and "economic impact" prongs). But see Armendariz v. 
Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that no due process remedy exists 
if takings remedy available); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 
(Cal. 1999); Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971, 974-76 
(N.Y. 1999) (equating "substantially advance" standard with more deferential due process 
standard). But see grmerally Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 
1997) (finding that allegations that rent control law failed to substantially advance any 
legitimate governmental interests does not create a cause of action under takings doctrine 
so long as a due process remedy might exist). 
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within the "otherwise proper" rubric of First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles, that the Takings Clause "is de-
signed ... to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper in-
terference amounting to a taking. "54 
The point of the first part of the Agins test is that when govern-
ment interferes with the use and enjoyment of property in a way that 
does not achieve any legitimate governmental goals then the govern-
ment has usurped, for all practical purposes, the incidents of owner-
ship.55 A property owner, for example, is not required to provide a 
reason, legitimate or otherwise, to justify the owner's decision to put 
private property to a particular lawful use. Nor does the owner have to 
provide a reason for not putting property to a particular use. And so 
when government prohibits a landowner from putting property to a 
particular use, and when government cannot provide a legitimate rea-
son for the prohibition-that is when it fails to substantially advance a 
legitimate governmental interest-then the government is acting in 
the manner of an owner. By restricting or prohibiting the use of pri-
vate property without a valid justification, the government assumes 
the mantle of an owner. Thus, it is appropriate to recognize that the 
first prong of the Agins test as a takings standard. 
By and large, however, the second prong, known as the economic 
impact test, has proven most effective for property owners in bringing 
takings claims. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yom,56 
the Court found three factors relevant to the inquiry of whether a 
regulation effects a taking: (1) the economic impact ofthe regulation; 
(2) its interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and 
(3) the character of the governmental action.57 The interplay of these 
three factors will determine whether a regulation has violated the 
"economically viable use" test of Agins. In addition, Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council amplified our understanding of this second 
prong of the Agins takings inquiry by expanding the terminology to 
include such formulations as "economically beneficial or productive 
use of land. "58 
There are also special categorical circumstances where a regula-
tion will almost certainly be a taking, as when there is an actual per-
54 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). 
55 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61. 
56 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978); accord Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 
(1979). 
57 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
58 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1017, 1019 (1992). 
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manent "physical invasion "59 of the property or when 100 percent of 
the economically beneficial or productive use of the property is 
taken. 60 
In one of the most significant takings decisions, the Supreme 
Court in Lucas refuted the notion that a regulation designed to pro-
tect the public interest by preventing harm is automatically immune 
from takings liability.61 In other words, the theory held that even if a 
regulation totally destroyed the value of property, no damages could 
be awarded if the regulation prevented harm.62 The Supreme Court 
disagreed.63 Instead, it first noted that it is of course true that no one 
has the right to develop property in a way that will injure a neighbor 
or cause a nuisance.64 However, the Court continued, a regulation 
that destroys the use and value of private property is always subject to 
scrutiny in accordance with the Fifth Amendment-unless the regula-
tion merely codifies the existing "common law nuisance" limitations 
on property.65 Thus, if a landowner never had the right to build a dam 
that would flood a neighbor's property in the first place, a regulation 
that also prevented that same dam building activity would not give rise 
to a taking. However, a regulation that restricted an otherwise permis-
sible use, for instance a regulation designed to preserve open space or 
59 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAlV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 420 (1982) 
(finding a taking where a cable television wire was placed on an apartment building); Kai-
ser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (finding a taking where regulation allowed trespasses onto 
property); Pumpelly ~. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) 
(finding a taking where water from government dam backs upon private property). The 
existence of a "physical invasion" relates to the "character" prong of the Penn Central test. 
See 438 U.S. at 124. 
60 A 100 percent loss of the beneficial or productive use is a classic example of a regu-
lation that deprives an owner of economically viable use. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. By 
"categorical taking" the Supreme Court meant that the other Penn Central balancing fac-
tors need not be considered. Id. But see Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (holding that an alleged loss of all economically viable use did not obviate a need to 
consider "investment-backed expectations"). 
61 505 U.S. at 1028. 
62 Not only did the state court in South Carolina follow this theory in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, but up until the time of the Supreme Court's decision, it was be-
coming the standard in other states as well. See 404 S.E.2d 895, 900 (S.C. 1991), rev'd 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992). For example, in Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 912-14 
(Wash. 1990), the Washington Supreme Court held that there could be no taking if a regu-
lation "prevented harm" because only regulations that "enhance a publicly owned right in 
property" could give rise to a taking. This analysis could not have survived Lucas, although 
it was repeated in Margola Associates v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23, 34 n.7 (Wash. 1993). See 
al50Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 11 n.5 (Wash. 1993). 
6~ Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. 
64 Id. at 1022. 
65 Id. at 1029-30. 
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to protect fisheries from natural erosion, may well give rise to a tak-
ing, especially if the regulation destroys 100 percent of the economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of the property.66 
In accordance with Lucas, the first step is to define the property 
right and analyze the extent of the allowable uses under traditional 
common law. As in Lucas, building homes in an existing subdivision is 
very likely to be an allowable use, but building a nuclear reactor on a 
fault zone would not be.67 
Next, the regulation itself should be analyzed. If it does not sub-
stantially advance a legitimate governmental interest, there is a tak-
ing.68 Compensation must be paid for the time during which the regu-
lation took the property.69 If the regulation is not rescinded, the 
government agency may be responsible for the full fair-market value 
of the affected property, meaning the value as if there were no regula-
tory restrictions in place.7o 
66 [d. at 1021 n.lO. 
67 [d. at 1029. 
66 Agins v. City of Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
69 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
319 (1987). Such compensation may be, for example, the rental value of the property dur-
ing the time in which the regulation denied use of the property. See, e.g., 'fuba Natural 
Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 'fuba Natural Res., Inc. V. United 
States, 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 
267 (11th Cir. 1987) (valuation in temporary taking found by comparing before and after 
fair market value and multiplying by fair rate of return), on appeal after remand, 896 F.2d 
1347 (11th Cir. 1990) (calculation of temporary takings damages). In Del Monte Dunes, the 
Court upheld an award of damages for a temporary taking. The state had purchased the 
property while the legal dispute was ongoing; the purchase merely converted the perma-
nent take into a temporary one. See generaUy 526 U.S. 687 (1999). For a useful discussion of 
temporary regulatory takings, see Hendler V. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 
which analogizes the length of time a vehicle is parked on property to the significance of a 
temporary taking finding de minimis intrusions not to be takings, but long-term, indefinite 
invasions to be takings. But see Hendler V. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 574 (1996) (finding 
only nominal damages on remand), aff'd,175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bass Enters. Prod. 
CO. V. United States, 133 F.3d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (denial of drilling permits on leases 
slated for possible condemnation at some indefinite time in future may be a temporary 
taking; court notes that "limited duration" of taking relevant to damages but not liability). 
No taking was found on remand in Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 
621 (2001), because drilling permits could not have been profitable. See also Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. V. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
the idea that moratoria can lead to temporary taking), reh g denied, reh g en bane denied, 228 
F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (The five judges who joined dissenting in the denial of the rehear-
ing en bane stated that "[t]he panel does not like the Supreme Court's Takings Clause ju-
risprudence very much, so it reverses First English . .. and adopts Justice Stevens's First Eng-
lish dissent.") , afl'd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
70 Other courts have offered extensive discussions of valuation in the context of regu-
latory takings. See generally E. Minerals Int'l, Inc. V. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 621 (1997) 
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Next, the impact of the regulation on the affected property 
should be analyzed. If the regulation "denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land"71 or if it leaves 100 percent of the 
property "economically idle"72 contrary to the owner's "reasonable 
investment-backed expectations,"73 then the Lucas categorical test is 
invoked and compensation must be paid.74 If only a portion of the 
beneficial or productive use of the parcel of property is completely 
destroyed, or if only a distinct severable property interest (such as a 
mineral right) is completely destroyed, then a court may find that 
there is a "partial taking. "75 
If less than 100 percent of the productive or beneficial use is de-
stroyed, the court will weigh various factors (including the economic 
(leasehold interest), judgment rev'd, appeal dismissed sub nom. Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 
1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. E. Minerals Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 
1960 (2002); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), judgment entered 
by 23 CI Ct. 653 (1991), vacated, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. 
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2994); Whitney Benefits, 
Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), opinion corrected by 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), afl'd, 
926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cf. William W. Wade, Penn Central s Economic Failings Con-
founded TakingsJurisprudence, 31 URB. LAw. 277 (1999); William S. Walter, Appraisal Methods 
and Regulatory Takings, New Directions for Appraisers, Judges, and Economists, 63 APPRAISAL]' 
331 (1995). In analyzing whether a wetland permit denial destroyed the value of property 
(thereby giving rise to a taking), the Claims Court in Formanek v. United States found that an 
offer of purchase from the Nature Conservancy was insufficient as a matter of law in refut-
ing a taking presumably because the economic return from using the lands as a nature 
preserve was unlikely to equal its value for development. See 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 797 (1989). It 
follows that such an offer would not be useful in establishing fair market value of the 
property once it is decided that compensation must be paid. See Olson v. United States, 292 
U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (speculative value of property does not necessarily determine fair 
market value); see also United States v. 117,763.00 Acres of Land, 410 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. 
Cal. 1976), afl'd sub nom. United States v. Shewfelt Invest. Co., 570 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1977). 
71 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
72Id. at 1019. 
7~ Seeid. at 1034 (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
74Id. at 1015. 
75 The Court in Lucas expressly deferred consideration of the issue of awarding com-
pensation for partial takings. Id. at 1016 n.7; see Part VIII.C infra. However, in Hodel v. 
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), a statute which purported to extinguish certain inheritance 
rights in Native American allotments was found to be a taking of that particular property 
right. Accord Youpee v. Babbitt, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (similar statute struck down). Similarly, 
First English may be considered as affirmation of a partial taking in time, that is a taking of 
the property for the period in which a regulation is in effect. 482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987). But 
see Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (rejecting "disaggregating" property into temporal seg-
ments"). The Tahoe-Sierra Court did not dispute that damages must be paid for temporary 
takings, but it did cast doubt on whether a temporary regulation could effect a taking. 
Lastly, in "physical invasion" cases, even where only a small portion of property is de-
stroyed, the state's action has always been considered to be a taking. See, e.g., Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CAlV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the regulation) in what has been called an "ad hoc" and 
"case-by-case" analysis to sort out whether "justice and fairness" call 
for a taking.76 The fact intensive nature of the inquiry necessitates an 
active role for the courts in regulatory takings litigation. 
III. THE COURT AND REGULATORY TAKINGS 
As with all legislative incursions on constitutional rights, the 
courts have a duty to correct the deprivation of property rights: 
In taking claims the judge does not sit as super legislator 
or executive, intent on preventing regulation that "goes too 
far," as a facile reading of Justice Holmes might imply .... 
The job of the court is to deal with a concrete claim, by an 
aggrieved person or persons, that their constitutional rights 
under the Fifth Amendment have been violated by some 
governmental action.77 
In an action against the United States that alleges a taking, the 
proper remedy is not to find that a regulation is unconstitutional be-
cause it takes without payment of just compensation, but, instead, is to 
require the payment of just compensation in accordance with any ap-
plicable statutory mechanism for providing such just compensation.78 
Under federal law, the Tucker Act provides such a remedy.79 So long 
as the Tucker Act is an available remedy, the Supreme Court has 
found that federal courts should not attempt to invalidate a federal 
76 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). For an example of a case 
where a wetland regulation did not destroy all value of property, but a taking was found 
nevertheless, see Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992). See also Fla. Rock Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999) (finding a 73 percent diminution a taking and 
awarding $752,000, plus interest, from 1980); infra notes 274, 278. 
77 Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 150 (1996) (citation omitted). For an ex-
tended treatment of the role of the courts in regulatory takings litigation, see BERNARD H. 
SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGU-
LATION 47-74 (1997). 
78 See generally Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Preseault 
v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding a taking under the Tucker Act). 
79 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 1 (1990). The Tucker Act is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (2001). It is an exclusive remedy for takings claims over 
$10,000. Id.; see also Gunn v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 118 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (8th Cir. 1997). 
An exception applies for mining claims located within national parks. Such suits may be 
brought in federal district court. See Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1607 (2001). 
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action that takes property.80 When money damages are not available, 
then an action for declaratory relief may be appropriate.81 The 
Tucker Act provides no right to a jury trial on the question of liability 
in a federal takings claim.82 
For an alleged regulatory taking by a state government, a claim-
ant must first pursue state takings remedies before utilizing a federal 
court remedy.83 In order for a court to know whether a governmental 
80 This rule may be observed more in the breach than reality. See, e.g., Bay View, Inc. ex 
rei. Alaska Native Vill. Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997): 
The Supreme Court is partly to blame for this confusion, as it has some-
times reached the merits of takings claims against the United States and at 
other times refused .... Adding to the confusion, many courts have viewed the 
Tucker Act as a jurisdictional hurdle against the payment of damages but not 
as an impediment to equitable relief. ... This, of course, is totally wrong. 
Id. at 1285-86 (citations omitted); see also Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 670, 
672 (7th Cir. 1992) (proper remedy to requirement to destroy salmonella infected birds 
that allegedly takes the birds is suit in the Court of Federal Claims,' not having the regula-
tion overturned in district court). In an unusual turn of events, in Cooley v. United States, the 
government granted the landowner a scaled back development permit, after it had cate-
gorically rejected the landowner's original application, and after the landowner had filed a 
claim for inverse condemnation. 46 Fed. Cl. 538, 539-41 (2000). The Court of Federal 
Claims was unimpressed by the government's attempt to avoid liability, finding that it 
lacked the authority to grant the permit that had never been sought. Id. at 547-49. 
81 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520-22 (1998) (O'Connor,j., plurality opinion for 
four Justices) (5-4 decision). 
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000). But see Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the Seventh 
Amendment and theJust Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 144 (1996) (arguing that the 
history of the Seventh Amendment, as well as the history of condemnation actions under 
common law, favor the use of jury trials in all inverse condemnation causes of action) . 
83 See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 186-94 (1985). The necessity of filing a state takings claim first in state court 
creates certain difficulties for preserving a federal takings claim for federal court. See, e.g., 
Saboffv. St.John's River Water Mgmt. Dist., 200 F.3d 1356, 1359-61 (11th Cir. 2000), reh'g 
en banc denied, 211 F.3d 596 (11th Cir. 2000) (table decision), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 823 
(2000) (discusses need to "reserve" federal claims in state court); Front Royal & Warren 
County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cil". 1998) (apply-
ing Burford abstention in case characterized by court as having "passed through procedural 
purgatory and wended its way to procedural hell"); Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 
852,862 (9th Cir. 1995) (federal claims properly reserved in state proceeding, but collat-
eral estoppel may apply); Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359 
(9th Cir. 1993); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364-
65 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying res judicata to state takings claim). These issues are addressed 
by Thomas E. Roberts in Procedural Implications of Williamson County/First English in Regu-
mtory Takings Litigation: Reservations, Remova~ Diversity, Supplemental Jurisdiction, Rooker-
Feldman, and ResJudicata, 31 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,353 (2001). 
For articles discussing the practical difficulties of ripeness in federal court, see gener-
ally Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait and Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regumtory Takings, 3 
WASH. U. j.L. & POL'y 99 (2000); Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial 
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action has actually taken property, a prospective claimant must obtain 
a final administrative decision before filing a takings claim.84 This 
ripeness requirement has proven to be an ineluctable burden for 
property owners asserting takings claims.85 Indeed, this issue is at the 
heart of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, discussed in Part IV infra. Once past 
this procedural hurdle, a claimant is entitled to a jury trial in trying a 
due process or takings claim against a state or local government in 
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.86 
As a result of development of takings law, landowners who em-
ploy the proper regulatory procedures are beginning to reap substan-
tial judgments in their favor from the courts. Prior to 1990, there were 
no significant cases where the federal government was found liable 
for a taking. That all changed with Whitney Benefits Inc. v. United 
States,87 where the United States was found responsible for $60 million 
in takings damages, plus interest, that ultimately exceeded $200 mil-
lion.88 In that case, the Office of Surface Mining refused to grant a 
permit to the owner of a valuable coal deposit in the Powder River 
Basin as a result of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977. The case was settled in early 1995, when the government 
agreed to pay plaintiffs $200 million for the taking.89 
The Whitney Benefits precedent was bolstered by the holdings in a 
number of wetlands takings cases. For example, in Beuri-Co. v. United 
States,90 the property owner survived a summary judgment motion on 
a takings claim that arose when the Army Corps of Engineers denied a 
Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1992); Gregory 
Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Takings Clause: A Survey of just Huw Far Federal Cuurts 
Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE Be ENvrL. L. 91 (1994); and 
Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Cuurts, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1 
(1995). 
84 See, e.g., Williamson Cuunty, 473 U.S. 186-87. 
85 Id. at 172; MacDonald, Sommer Be Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986). A 
requirement to sell transferable development credits is not a prerequisite for filing a tak-
ings claim. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739-40 (1997). 
86 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709-11 
(1999). 
87 926 F.2d 1169, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
88 Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394,417 app. (1989), opinion COT-
rected by 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), affd926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
89 See generally George W. Miller, Regulatory Takings Claims: The Litigation Process, in IN-
VERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GoVERNMENT LIABILITY 205 (A.L.I.-ABA. COURSE 
OF STUDY, Oct. 17, 1996), availabk in Westlaw, SB14 AU-ABA 205. 
90 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988). 
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permit to fill a calcareous fen bog91 in Minnesota. In early 1992, the 
federal government settled and paid $761,818 for the wetland.92 And 
in Bowles v. United States,93 a taking was found after the Army Corps of 
Engineers denied a wetlands dredge and fill permit in 1984 to the 
owner of a residential lot. The permit was necessary for a septic sys-
tem installation which was necessary to build a single-family home.94 
Fifty-five thousand dollars, plus interest, was awarded to the owner of 
the lot.95 In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,96 the Federal Circuit 
upheld a $2.6 million takings award arising out of a dredge and fill 
permit denial. In the fifth iteration of Florida Rock,97 the Court of Fed-
eral Claims awarded $752,444, plus interest, from the date of taking 
for the taking of ninety-eight acres of a wetland limestone quarry. In 
Cooley v. United States,98 the same court awarded $2,065,200.42, plus 
interest, for taking of thirty-three acres of wetlands. Finally, in one of 
the very few cases finding a taking as a result of the impact from the 
Endangered Species Act,99 the Court of Federal Claims found a taking 
as a result of the protection of two species of fish. IOO As the following 
sections will show, however, there have been numerous cases where 
landowners have not prevailed because of a variety of procedural and 
substantive barriers erected by the courts. 
IV. THE RIPENESS OF THE PROBLEM: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT REQUIRES A TAKINGS CLAIM TO BE RIPE 
In Palazzolo, the Rhode Island Supreme Court began by holding 
that Mr. Palazzolo's "claim for (just] compensation was not ripe for 
review. "101 Traditionally, courts have required litigants to utilize ad-
ministrative procedures in order to determine exactly what can, and 
91 In geologic terms, a calcareous fen bog is a wetland in limestone topography. See id. 
at 43 n.2. 
92 See Dean Robuffoni, Oumer's Victory Over Land-Use, MINN. STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 24, 
1992. 
93 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994). 
94 Id. at 43-4. 
95 Id. at 53. 
96 28 F.3d l171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
97 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999). 
98 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (2000). 
9916 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2001). 
100 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 317-20 
(2001). But see In reWater Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 497 (Haw. 2000) (no taking 
when water rights denied). 
101 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I. 2000), a/I'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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what cannot, be done with a disputed parcel of property. Mter all, un-
til the parties know what uses have been denied, how can the court 
know whether there has been a taking? The United States Supreme 
Court held in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamil-
ton Bank oj Johnson CityI°2 that a takings litigant must obtain a final 
administrative decision from the permitting agency before bringing a 
takings action. The Court further held that if the alleged regulatory 
taking was done by a state or local governmental agency, then a land-
owner must utilize the state courts before going to federal court.103 In 
Palazzolo, the state supreme court believed that Mr. Palazzolo had not 
met the first test of Williamson County, finding that Mr. Palazzolo 
should have sought additional permits.104 
In City oj Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,105 the Su-
preme Court seemed to be influenced at oral argument by the fact 
that the landowner had applied for at least five permits, with the pa-
rameters of each subsequent application tailored to the city's con-
cerns and suggestions that it provided on each previous denia1.106 
There is no set rule governing how many applications is enough for a 
claim to be ripe. Rather, the Court has stressed that there must be cer-
tainty regarding what uses are available for the property.107 As articu-
lated in Williamson County, the question is whether "the administrative 
agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will 
102 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
108 [d. at 194-97. 
104 Tavares, 746A.2d at 714. 
105 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
106 This is indicated in the exchange between the Court and the counsel for the peti-
tioner-city, George fuhas: 
MR. YUHAS: ... This case is not atypical in some respects. The city was faced 
with a complex decision it had to reconcile competing interests, sift through 
facts, and exercise its discretion and judgment, and it did so. 
QUESTION: Five times. 
MR. YUHAS: It did so, Your Honor. It was a complicated project .... 
QUESTION: This was the fifth plan presented, right? Each one was succes-
sively rejected for a different reason each time? 
MR. YUHAS: The initial rejections were for density, and the fifth one was re-
jected down for two reasons only. There was access, and there was the restora-
tion plan, and that was the first time that-in fact, the city council had faced 
the question as to whether there was an adequate recommended plan. 
QUESTION: And this is typical, you say? 
Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Del Monte v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 
U.S. 687 (1999) (No. 97-1253),1998 WL 721087, at *4, (Oct. 7, 1998). 
107 See Williamson Cuunty, 473 U.S. at 191. 
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apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question." 108 In 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of YOlo,l09 the Court stressed that 
a case is ripe if "the type and intensity of development legally permit-
ted" is known.110 Likewise, "[t]he demand for finality is satisfied 
[when there is] ... no question here about how the 'regulations at 
issue [apply] to the particular land in question."'lll 
Landowners who only halfheartedly pursue the permit process 
have difficulty proving the existence of a taking. As exemplified in 
Supreme Court holdings from Agins v. City of Tiburon,112 and United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,m to MacDonald, Sommer & Frates 
v. County of YOlo,114 there is not a ripe takings claim until the land-
owner first pursues the administrative permitting process and receives 
a final decision. State courts have adhered to this rule as well.115 
In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agenty,1l6 the Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency imposed an artificial finality requirement upon an 
elderly landowner. Specifically, after denying her a permit to build her 
retirement home on a half-acre lot, the agency suggested that she 
could not bring an inverse condemnation action until she tried to sell 
a group of transferable development rights in order, supposedly, to 
determine the value of the affected lot.ll7 The Supreme Court dis-
108 [d. 
109 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
110 [d. at 348. 
m Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 u.s. 725, 739 (1997) (quoting William-
son County, 473 u.s. at 191) (fourth alteration in original). 
112 447 u.s. 255, 260-61 (1980) (holding that enactment of zoning scheme alone does 
not take property and the owner must apply for permits). 
113 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (finding that designation of property as a wetland is not, 
in and of itself, a taking; the landowner must first apply for permits). 
114 See genl!rally 477 u.s. 340 (finding a taking only after a final administrative decision 
has been rendered). 
115 See, e.g., Calprop Corp. v. City of San Diego 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792, 800-01 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000) (holding futility exception to be read narrowly; landowners must pursue per-
mit process); Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 593 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Conn. 
1991) (citing MacDonald, 477 u.s. at 353 n.9) (finding landowner's driveway permit appli-
cation too "grandiose"); Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.1. 2000) 
(holding landowner actually had to complete permitting process despite belief permit 
would probably be denied), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1253 (R.1. 1997) (holding 
even though wetlands permit denied, other uses still possible). 
116 520 U.S. 725 (1997). 
117 [d. at 732. 
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agreed and found that she did not have to try to sell the credits before 
she could bring her takings claim to court.llS 
In the case of Mr. Palazzolo, the Supreme Court held that his 
case was ripe. First, the Court found that based upon: 
[T] he unequivocal nature of the wetland regulations at issue 
and by the Council's application of the regulations to the 
subject property . 
. . . [T]he Council's decisions make plain that the agency 
interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from engaging 
in any filling or development activity on the wetlands .... On 
the wetlands there can be no fill ... for its own sake; no fill 
for a beach club, either rustic or upscale; no fill for a subdi-
vision; no fill for any likely or foreseeable use. And with no 
fill there can be no structures and no development on the 
wetlands. Further permit applications were not necessary to 
establish this point.119 
In essence, the Court has embraced a futility exception to the law of 
regulatory takings. With respect to the uplands portion of the prop-
erty, the Court found that since all parties agreed that the uplands 
could be developed to allow a single $200,000 home, and since the 
State's assertions of ambiguity on this point were improperly raised, 
"there is no genuine ambiguity in the record as the extent of permit-
ted development on petitioner's property, either on the wetlands or 
the uplands. "120 
Remarkably, it appears that the parties' agreement may have 
been premature. Mter the United States Supreme Court issued its de-
cision, and before the Rhode Island courts began proceedings on re-
mand, Anthony Palazzolo applied to build a single home on the up-
land turnaround area, allegedly worth $200,000.121 On August 30, 
2001, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management 
118 [d. at 740-42. But see Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81. 108 (1997), aff'd, 189 
F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Good, the Court of Federal Claims stated that Suitum held 
that the existence of transferable development rights was relevant to determine whether 
there had been a taking. However, the Court in Suitum expressly said that it was not reach-
ing that particular issue. 520 U.S. at 728. 
119 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 619, 221. 
120 [d. at 623. 
121 Telephone Interview with Anthony Palazzolo (Aug. 30, 2001). 
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denied the permit, claiming the property was unsuitable for a residen-
tial septic system.122 
What may become the most significant aspect of the ripeness 
holding in Palazzolo is the suggestion that once a landowner has a 
meaningful permit application denied, the burden shifts to the govern-
ment to indicate what, if any, other uses of the property may be available.123 
Several times in the opinion the Court implies that the government 
must "explain" or give an "indication" of its potential acceptance of 
another or a reduced use.124 First, the Court implied that a landowner 
must first submit an application to provide the agency with an oppor-
tunity to "explain" the reach of its restrictions: "[A] landowner may 
not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, 
using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a 
challenged regulation."125 Next, after noting that the 11.4 acre beach 
club had been rejected under a "compelling public purpose" standard 
the Court notes, "There is no indication the Council would have ac-
cepted the application had petitioner's proposed beach club occu-
pied a smaller surface area. "126 
Finally, the Court put it more directly later in the opinion when it 
found that "the limitations the wetland regulations imposed were 
clear from the Council's denial of his applications, and there is no 
indication that any use involving any substantial structures or im-
provements would have been allowed."127 The lesson here is that once 
an applicant submits and has rejected a meaningful application to put 
real property to an economically viable use, an agency must at the 
very least come forward and suggest other uses that might be available 
for the property. Such uses must, of course, be economically meaning-
ful. But the agency also must do this in good faith in order to avoid 
the spectacle of Del Monte Dunes, where the applicant pursued five 
successive and increasingly restricted applications at the city's sugges-
tion.128 
122 [d. 
m See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620-21. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. at 620 (emphasis added). 
126 [d. 
127 [d. at 625. 
128 See 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
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V. REQUIREMENT OF THE LOWER COURTS THAT TAKINGS CHALLENGES 
TO WETLANDS REGULATIONS BE RIPE 
In the context of the regulation of wetlands, the lower state and 
federal courts have had many opportunities to consider the ripeness 
question. For example, in Howard W. Heck & Associates, Inc. v. United 
States,129 a property owner was unable to utilize a wetland in New Jer-
sey because the Army Corps of Engineers could not process his per-
mit. The Corps was unable to process his permit because the owner 
had not acquired the necessary state water quality certification as part 
of the wetlands permitting process.130 The State had previously re-
fused to provide the water quality certification because the owner de-
clined to enter into an exhaustive (and he thought futile) discussion 
of project alternatives. l3l The Federal Circuit held that because there 
was no final agency decision there could be no claim for a taking.132 
The court also rejected the argument that the permitting process was 
"futile. "133 
The Court of Federal Claims found no taking when a wetland 
permit necessary to build a fifty-nine-acre resort project was denied in 
Plantation Landing Resort, Inc. v. United States134 because (1) the plain-
tiff had not proved ownership of land below the mean high water 
mark; (2) the plaintiff failed to renew a coastal use permit from the 
State of Louisiana;135 and (3) the plaintiff had not shown a denial of 
all economically beneficial and productive use. The court found it 
unnecessary to weigh the factors for a noncategorical taking which 
were outlined in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,136 
This is somewhat inexplicable because, as discussed in Part II supra, 
the most logical reading of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and 
129 134 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
130 Id. at 1470-7l. 
mId. at 1471 nA. 
132 See id. at 1471-72. 
us Id. at 1472. 
134 30 Fed. Cl. 63 (1993), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (table decision). 
135 Id. But see City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 224 (1995) (no tak-
ing because local agency would have denied permits); City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United 
States, 30 Fed. Cl. 715 (1994) (takings claim cognizable even without state permits because 
the Army Corps of Engineers would have denied permit with or without the permits); 
Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (taking found despite lack of state per-
mits because the evidence was clear that such permits would have been granted if applied 
for). 
136 Plantation Landing Resort, 30 Fed. Cl. at 69 (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 475 U.S. 224, 224-25 (1986». 
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Penn Central would be to engage in the multifactqr balancing test after 
finding that there is no categorical taking. 
The Court of Federal Claims was initially more sympathetic to the 
plaintiff in City National Bank of Miami v. United States,137 where the 
owner of a 1247-acre tract of land applied for a dredge and fill permit 
necessary to mine limestone located on a 190-acre wetland. Here, the 
plaintiff survived a summary judgment motion because the court 
concluded that the Army Corps of Engineers would have denied the 
project with or without the state certification.138 In other words, the 
case was ripe. In the first Florida Rock, Inc. v. United States appellate de-
cision,139 the court found that a takings claim could only be litigated 
on the ninety-eight acres that was the subject of the denied permit, 
despite the fact that the plaintiff owned a total of nearly 1500 acres. 
Until permits were applied for on the additional acreage, a takings 
claim on these additional parcels would not be ripe. However, in a 
subsequent proceeding the court concluded that it would have been 
futile to apply for a permit to use the remaining 1462 acres, making 
the claim ripe. l40 
In City National Bank the court allowed the question to go to trial 
of whether all 1247 acres had been taken despite the fact that the 
permit denial was for only 190 acres.141 The court distinguished the 
early iteration of Florida Rock (finding the question of the 1462 acres 
not ripe), because the permit denial in City National Bank expressly 
referred to all 1247 acres.142 The court did not say that those acres 
had been taken, but did allow the trial to proceed on all 1247 acres.143 
However, in a subsequent decision, the court found that the federal 
government was not responsible for a taking, because local regulation 
would have prohibited the limestone mining anyway.144 
There are practical limits to the finality requirement, usually put 
in terms of the one meaningful application standard. If the available 
permitting process is too burdensome, a futility exception might ap-
137 30 Fed. CI. 715. 
us [d. at 720. 
139 791 F.2d 893, 904-05 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
140 Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 266-82 L, 2000 WL 331830, at *9-*15 
(Fed. CI. Mar. 28, 2000). 
141 30 Fed. CI. at 720-21. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. 
144 City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 33 Fed. CI. 224 (1995). 
26 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:1 
ply.145 For example, in Hage v. United Statesl46 the court stated: "[T]he 
law does not require plaintiffs to apply for a permit if the procedure 
itself is not a reasonable variance procedure ... and is so burdensome 
that it effectively deprives the property of value. "147 
Likewise, in East Cape May Associates v. New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection,l48 the court noted that to "require a developer 
to submit a multiplicity of successive applications in order to attempt 
to divine, without administrative guidance, what, if any, development 
of its property will be permitted would be inconsistent with due proc-
ess of law. "149 The "one meaningful application" rule has been 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit.l50 
However, an equivocal permit denial from the Army Corps of 
Engineers may not be enough to save the Corps from takings liability. 
A denial of a permit "without prejudice" is still final agency action 
that may take property.151 In Cooley v. United States,152 the Corps appar-
ently began to worry about its liability after a takings claim had been 
filed by a landowner who had been denied a permit. Following the 
advice of counsel, on the eve of trial, the Corps issued the landowner 
a scaled-back permit that he had not requested.15' The Court of Fed-
eral Claims was unimpressed, ruling that the Corps had no authority 
to issue the scaled-back permit and thereby attempt to convert the 
permanent taking into a temporary one.l54 
However, if the Corps returns a permit application with a reason-
able request for more information, the landowner must provide that 
145 See, e.g., Hochne v. County of San Bernadino, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that "the final decision requirement can be avoided if attempts to comply with that 
request would be futile"). 
146 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996). 
147 [d. at 164 (citations omitted). 
148 693 A.2d 114 (NJ. Super. Ct App. Div.1997). 
149 [d. at 122. But since the developer had not begun a meaningful application process 
his claim was not ripe. [d. at 121-22; accurd Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 621 
(2001). The Court went further stating that "[g]overnment authorities, of course, may not 
burden property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to 
avoid a final decision." Palaz.:wlo, 533 U.S. at 621 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,698 (1999». 
150 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1996)."1'0 
satisfy this requirement, a California landowner must submit to local decision-makers at 
least one meaningful application for a development project and a variance." [d. (quoting 
S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1990». 
l5t City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 224, 227-28 (1995). 
152 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (2000). 
155 [d. at 541. 
154 [d. at 549-51. 
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information and obtain a final decision on the permit application be-
fore bringing a takings claim.155 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island should assist landowners arguing takings 
cases before these and other lower courts. Courts have at least one 
loadstar against which to judge when enough is enough. Undeniably, 
it is still necessary to ripen a case, even if the ripening process is in-
convenient, time-consuming, and expensive. But it should no longer 
be necessary to engage in the ripening process once it transforms 
from utility into ritual. 
VI. THE QUESTION OF WHAT HApPENS WHEN PROPERTY IS ACQUIRED 
PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF A REGULATION, THE APPLICATION 
OF WHICH ALLEGEDLY TAKES PROPERTY 
One of the decisive issues to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island was that Mr. Palazzolo acquired his property in 
1978, seven years after the creation of CRMC and several more years 
after the State began to require permits for the filling of coastal wet-
lands.156 He could state no claim for a regulatory taking because he 
had no investment-backed expectations in trying to develop the prop-
erty,157 and the right to fill was not part of the title that he acquired 
from Shore Gardens.158 Put bluntly, "all subsequent owners take the 
land subject to the pre-existing limitations and without the compensa-
tion owed to the original affected owner. "159 On June 28, 2001, the 
Supreme Court rejected this so-called "notice rule" exception to the 
Takings Clause. 
A. Is the Underlying Title of Property Diminished When it is Acquired 
Subject to a Regulatory Scheme? 
As a preliminary matter, it should be asked who was on notice of 
what? Certainly landowners like Mr. Palazzolo were on notice not only 
of the permitting requirements affecting the filling of property, but 
also of the centuries of tradition wherein landowners freely reclaimed 
155 Lakewood Assocs. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 320, 333-34 (1999). 
156 Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
157 [d. at 717. 
158 [d. at 716. 
159 [d. at 716-17. 
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tidelands. l60 But Mr. Palazzolo was not on notice that there was an 
outright ban on all filling of wetlands for residential or private recrea-
tional development. He was not on notice that the public would for-
evermore enjoy the benefits of his property in its undeveloped state 
without payment.161 Likewise, Rhode Island was on notice that a regu-
lation that goes "too far" is a taking and that, under the Constitution, 
"compensation must be paid" when economically beneficial use is de-
nied.162 That Mr. Palazzolo essentially acquired by operation of law the 
property from himself, or at least from a corporation of which he was 
the sole shareholder, suggests that an inflexible notice acquisition 
rule puts form over substance.163 
In NoUan v. California Coastal Commission,l64 the Court cast doubt 
on the validity of the "notice rule. "165 The California Coastal Commis-
sion was established by the California Coastal Act of 1972. Pursuant to 
the Act, "stringent regulation of development along the California 
coast had been in place at least since 1976," and, in particular, a deed 
restriction granting the public an easement for lateral beach access 
"had been imposed since 1979 on all 43 shoreline new development 
projects in [the vicinity of the Nollan property]."I66 The Nollans pur-
chased their property after this time and became subject to the Com-
mission's forced dedication requirement. The Supreme Court found 
that the restriction violated the Takings Clause because it did not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests.I67 
However, in dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the Supreme 
Court's holding on, among other grounds, the fact that the Nollans 
were "on notice that new developments would be approved only if 
provisions were made for lateral beach access. "168 With such notice, 
the Nollans "could have no reasonable expectation of ... approval of 
160 See, e.g., Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.1. 
348,363-64 (1879) (upholding right to wharf out and fill wetlands and tidal waters). 
161 Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding there is an 
expectation to be compensated for a physical occupation of one's property by the gov-
ernment). 
162 Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
16~ SeeK & KConstr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996), rev'd on other grounds, 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998). In a case where ownership was 
acquired via a complicated trust ownership, an intermediate appellate court had found 
that such a change in ownership did not implicate the notice rule. Id. 
164 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
165 See id. at 841-42. 
166 Id. at 859 (Brennan & Marshall,lJ., dissenting). 
167 Id. at 840-42. 
168 Id. at 860 (Brennan & Marshall,lJ., dissenting). 
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their permit application without any deed restriction ensuring public 
access to the ocean. "169 A majority of the Supreme Court Justices dis-
agreed, stating: 
Nor are the Nollans' rights altered because they acquired the 
land well after the Commission had begun to implement its 
policy. So long as the Commission could not have deprived 
the prior owners of the easement without compensating 
them, the prior owners must be understood to have trans-
ferred their full property rights in conveying the 10t.1'° 
Whether it be a taking by a physical invasion or by the ap-
plication of a regulation, there is no logical reason why the 
existence of a regulatory scheme should put landowners on 
"notice" that the right to put their property to an economi-
cally viable use has been taken: 
The reasons are obvious. A requirement that a person obtain 
a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her prop-
erty does not itself "take" the property in any sense: after all, 
the very existence of a permit system implies that permission 
may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the prop-
erty as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there 
may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a 
permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 
"economically viable" use of the land in question can it be 
said that a taking has occurred.l7l 
However, before Palazzolo was decided there had been a number of 
significant cases where the courts have reached the opposite conclu-
sion including state courts in New York172 and Virginia,m and the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,174 and for the District of Co-
169./d. 
170 NoUan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2. 
171 United Statesv. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985). 
172 Soon Duck Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997); In re Gazza v. N.Y. 
State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997); In reAnello v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997); Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489 
(N.Y. 1997). 
m City ofVrrginia Beach v. Bell, 98 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998). 
174 Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Crr. 1999); Forest Props., Inc. v. United 
States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Crr. 1999). 
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lumbia.175 But as one court recently noted when confronted with a 
theory similar to that adopted by these other courts: "[U] nder such 
logic, [government] could pass a law that stated that no one could 
build on their property. Mter all property had passed hands once, the 
right to build on one's property would be lost to everyone."176 The 
rule that the purchase of regulated property destroys the right to 
bring a claim for a regulatory taking caused by the application of the 
regulation has also been heavily criticized elsewhere as violating the 
common law meaning of property. 177 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Palazzolo put to rest once and 
for all the notion that title to property is altered when it changes 
hands. The Court first of all rejected the idea that the right to develop 
property is a right "created by the State"178 and that the State can 
redefine the property rights of subsequent owners by prospective leg-
islation because "they purchased or took title with notice of the limita-
tion."179 The Court was unimpressed by this argument noting that 
"[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean 
bundle. "180 The Court reasoned: 
Were [the Court] to accept [that] rule, the postenactment 
transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to 
defend any action restricting land use, no matter how ex-
treme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, 
to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought 
not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to 
challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of 
land.181 
The State and many amici had suggested that a rule allowing purchas-
ers of regulated property to challenge the application of those regula-
tions would give the purchasers a ''windfall,'' especially if the value of 
the property had been depressed by the regulations. The Court did 
not agree: 'The State's rule also would work a critical alteration to the 
nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of 
175 Dist. Intown Prop. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cit. 1999), 
cert denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
176 Store Safe Redlands Assocs. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726, 735 (1996). 
177 See Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Qyartet: Retreating from the "Rule of 
Law, "42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 345 (1998). 
178 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001). 
179 [d. 
ISO [d. 
181 [d. at 627. 
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the ability to transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the 
regulation. The State may not by this means secure a windfall for it-
self. "182 Relying upon the holding in Nollan,183 the Court found that it 
was imperative that subsequent owners such as Mr. Palazzolo take the 
same rights as the original owners at the time the regulation is 
adopted. 
B. Background Principles of State Law and the Exclusion of the Full Panoply 
of Land Use Regulation 
An alternative way of expressing the "notice theory" of regulation 
is to suggest that the underlying background principles of property 
must include all existing regulatory constraints at the time of acquisi-
tion. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~ the Court said that a 
regulatory restriction which simply reflected the application of "back-
ground principles," such as those in place against nuisances, could 
not rise to the level of a taking.184 There being no right to commit a 
nuisance, there can be no "taking" when the ability to commit a nui-
sance is denied. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the State and several amici 
strenuously argued that the "background principles" rubric of Lucas 
must include the entire panoply of regulations in place when property 
is transferred.185 In this respect, they argued, Lucas overruled Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission. 186 
This was an easy argument for the Supreme Court to dispose of: 
It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be 
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed 
into a background principle of the State's law by mere virtue 
of the passage of title .... A regulation or common-law rule 
cannot be a background principle for some owners but not 
for others .... A law does not become a background princi-
ple for subsequent owners by enactment itself.187 
Nonetheless, this is not necessarily the end of the inquiry. There 
may be other background principles that apply equally to all land-
owners, regardless of the date of acquisition. Such background prin-
ciples may include the doctrines of nuisance or public trust. And 
182 [d. 
183 See id. at 609, 629-30. 
184 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
185 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625-26. 
186 See id. at 629. 
187 [d. at 629-30. 
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some may still argue that long-standing regulations, those that have 
been in place for generations, have evolved into background princi-
ples. 
This question of background principles leads to a natural inquiry 
into exactly what rights a property owner has in the first place. Tradi-
tionally, property rights included an array of rights such as the right to 
sell, give away, hold, and protect a particular thing. As the Supreme 
Court said, the Constitution protects a "group of rights inhering in 
the citizen's relation to the physical thing."188 The Supreme Court has 
noted that "not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those 
economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law in back of 
them. "189 Except for the specific property rights created by federal 
law, such as federal mining claims,190 state law will generally determine 
whether something is a protected property right.191 As the Court in 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis stated, "[W]e are mindful 
of the basic axiom that' [p]roperty interests ... are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law.'"192 However, there are instances 
where federal law can come into play in defining the nature and ex-
tent of property rights, such as the navigational servitude or sub-
merged lands boundaries.193 In the 1992 case of Nixon v. United 
188 United States v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
189 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) (stating there was 
no legally protected property interest in maintaining specific water levels in reservoir). 
190 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992). Once a mining 
claim is determined to constitute a valid property interest, then state law will control how it 
can be sold, transferred, inherited, and the like-unless any particular aspect of that prop-
erty right is preempted by federal law. See Duguid v. Best, 291 F.2d 235, 239, 242 (9th Cir. 
1961). 
191 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32. 
192 480 U.S. 470, 519 (1987) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980» (alterations in original). See also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1,20-24 (1990) 
(providing a detailed articulation of the principle that state law defines the nature of 
property rights); Kinross Copper Corp. v. Oregon, 981 P.2d 833 (Or. App. 1999) (denying 
a waste water discharge permit for mining on federal mining claims not a taking because 
there is no right to pollute), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 960 (2000). 
193 See, e.g., M &J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148,1153 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing the impact of federal law of navigational servitude and submerged lands on prop-
erty definitions); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (discussing the submerged lands and navi-
gational servitude); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900) (defining property 
rights in the context of submerged lands); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 
F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (navigational servitude), a/I'd, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
reh g en banc denied, 231 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In Palm Beach Isles, the court found that 
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States,194 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia provided one of the more thorough contemporary judicial discus-
sions on how property rights are created through "mutually reinforc-
ing understandings" and "uniform custom and practice. "195 There the 
court engaged in a lengthy historical discussion of the ownership and 
treatment of presidential papers, concluding that Richard Nixon had 
a property interest in his presidential papers, which are now in the 
possession of the Archivist of the United States.196 
Federal law, however, will be relevant when the federal govern-
ment is involved in an action that may "take" the property interest. As 
explained by the Ninth Circuit in Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United 
States, "[t]he determination of the type of interest taken upon exer-
cise of the federal power of eminent domain is governed by federal 
law, but will normally be made in accordance with local 
definitions. "197 In Adaman, the court looked to Arizona law in finding 
that when the government took approximately 8.3% of the farmland 
in the area of an agricultural development project, it had to pay com-
pensation not only for the land, but also for the pro rata share of an 
irrigation district assessment.198 Because under Arizona law this as-
sessment was inseparable from the land, it was in fact an equitable 
servitude which warranted takings compensation.l99 Thus, local law is 
crucial in determining the nature of an aquatic property interest in 
condemnation cases.2OO 
The dear statements in Lucas that property interests must first be 
identified before a takings analysis is begun and that an "independent 
source such as state law" will help define property rights201 have led to 
a move to redefine property rights under state law in order to avoid 
a permit denial for environmental reasons, rather than navigational reasons, did not in-
voke the navigational servitude "background principle." [d. at 1384. 
194 978 F.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
195 [d. at 1275-76. 
196 [d. at 1277-87. 
197 278 F.2d 842, 847 n.4 (9th Cir. 1960) (citing United States ex TeL Tenn. Valley Auth. 
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943»; see also Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond 
Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that federal courts 
are not bound by state law but look to it for aid in discerning the scope of property inter-
ests). These formulations may be inconsistent with Justice O'Connor's dissent in Preseault, 
494 U.S. at 20-24. 
198 Adaman, 278 F.2d at 847. 
199 [d. 
200 See id. 
201 Lucasv. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1030 (1992) (quoting Bd. ofRe-
gents of State ColIs. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972». 
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takings arguments.202 But, under any accepted understanding of 
property, it is clear that property rights have a source so fundamental 
in our jurisprudence that contemporary regulatory definitions or 
redefinitions cannot alter the elemental nature of the right.203 
202 See id. at 1028-29. 
20~ See, e.g., Schneiderv. Cal. Dep't. ofCorr., 151 F.3d 1194,1200-01 (9th Cir. 1998). 
The ... Court's recognition of the unremarkable proposition that state law 
may affirmatively create constitutionally protected "new property" interests in 
no way implies that a State may by statute or regulation roU back or eliminate 
traditional "old property" rights. As the Supreme Court has made clear, "the 
government does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights." ... 
Rather, there is, we think, a "core" notion of constitutionally protected prop-
erty into which state regulation simply may not intrude without prompting 
Takings Clause scrutiny. 
Id. at 1200 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAlV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982». 
Justice Marshall, in his concurrence in Pruneyard Slwpping Center v. Robins, noted: 
I do not understand the Court to suggest that rights of property are to be 
defined solely by state law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier to 
the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a state government. The 
constitutional terms "life, liberty, and property" do not derive their meaning 
solely from the provisions of positive law.... Quite serious constitutional 
questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain catego-
ries of common-law rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demon-
strate that there are limits on governmental authority to abolish "core" com-
mon-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a compelling 
showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy. 
447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall,]., concurring). 
The Ninth Circuit observed: 
"[T]here is, we think, a 'core' notion of constitutionally protected property," 
and a state's power to alter it by legislation "operates as a one-way ratchet of 
sorts," allowing the states to create new property rights but not to encroach 
on traditional property rights." ... [W]ere the rule otherwise, States could 
unilaterally dictate the content of-indeed altogether opt out of--both the 
Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause simply by statutorily recharacteriz-
ing traditional property-law concepts. 
Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1200-01), reh'g, 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 122 S. Ct. 2355 (2002) (No. 01-1325). 
Lawrence H. Tribe writes: 
To the degree that private property is to be respected in the face of republi-
can and positivist visions, it becomes necessary to resist even an explicit gov-
ernment proclamation that all property acquired in the jurisdiction is held 
subject to government's limidess power to do with it what government wishes. 
Indeed, government must be denied the power to give binding force to so 
sweeping an announcement, ... if we are to give content to the just compen-
sation clause as a real constraint on [government] power .... [Elxpectations 
protected by the clause must have their source outside positive law. 
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Nevertheless, in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,2M the Oregon Su-
preme Court found there was not a taking when a property owner was 
unable to build on a beach dune area because the ownership rights of 
the dune did not include the right to exclude the public from its cus-
tomary use of the dunes.205 Two members of the United States Su-
preme Court were troubled by what they saw as an abrogation of exist-
ing property definitions.206 In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i 
County Planning Commission,207 the Hawaiian Supreme Court held that 
land ownership in Hawaii is burdened by the right of Native Hawai-
ians to utilize property to "gather" natural resources in accordance 
with native custom that may be incompatible with development.208 
Both the Cannon Beach and Public Access Shoreline Hawaii holdings have 
been criticized as an attempt to redefine property rights.209 In the case 
of Palazzolo, the State suggested in its briefs and at oral argument that 
background principles of nuisance and the public trust doctrine 
should insulate the State from liability. The issues of nuisance and the 
public trust, not part of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision, 
and not part of the questions presented, were not addressed by the 
Supreme Court, but may be important factual concerns in other 
cases. 
1. Is Filling a Wetland a Nuisance? 
In virtually every instance where a government has suggested that 
ordinary environmental regulations that prohibit ordinary develop-
ment activities can be insulated from the Takings Clause because the 
prohibited activity is alleged to be a "nuisance," the government has 
lost. The Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the courts with the most experience in examining takings 
LAURENCE H. TIuBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 9-7, at 609 (2d ed. 1988). 
204 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993). 
205 [d. at 456-57. 
206 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (mem.) (Scalia & O'Connor, 
lJ., dissenting), denying cert. to 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), off'g, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 
1992). 
207 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995). 
208 [d. at 1272-73. 
209 See David J. Bederman, The Curiuus Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and judicial 
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1375, 1440-42 (1996). See gmerally David L. Callies, Custom and 
Public Trust: Backgruund Principles of State Property Law, in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RE-
LATED GoVERNMENT LIABIUTY, 699 (A.L.I.-A.BA COURSE OF STUDY, Sept 30,1999), avail-
able in Westlaw, SF64 ALI-ABA 191. See infra Part V.B.2 for further discussion of public 
trust doctrine. 
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claims in the context of federal wetland regulations, have expressly 
rejected this notion in every case where it has considered the idea.210 
Other courts have agreed as well.211 Most importantly, the United 
States Supreme Court in Lucas was highly skeptical of the idea that 
building a home in a residential subdivision could constitute a com-
mon law nuisance.212 
In Just v. Marinette Coonty,213 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to 
change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a 
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which in-
jures the rights of others. "214 Just was cited with approval by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Orion Corp. v. Washington: "Orion never had 
the right to dredge and fill its tidelands. "215 A similar result was 
reached by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.216 However, in Florida 
Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit found housing 
to be a more valuable use than swampland,217 while the court in 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States expressly rejected the Just formu-
210 See Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discuss-
ing applicability of "nuisance exception"); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 340 
(1992) (rejecting assertion that filling a wetlands would constitute an "extreme threat to 
public health"); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 168 (1990) (use of 
wetlands not a nuisance, even if Congress regulated or prohibited use), vacated, 18 F.3d 
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fla. Rock Indust., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 170 (1985) 
(making a nuisance exception coterminous with the police power would read the Com-
pensation Clause "out of existence"), a/I'd in part, vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); see also Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1177 n.1O (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (rejecting nuisance defense to regulatory taking of coal mine); Yancey v. United 
States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (takings damages awarded to turkey farmer 
who had his turkeys quarantined during an outbreak of Asian flu despite obvious nuisance 
implications) . 
211 See, e.g., McDougal v. County oflmperial, 942 F.2d 668, 678 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[E]ven 
in those cases where the activity restrained was akin to a public nuisance and the state's 
interest was admittedly substantial, the Court has gone on to weigh the claimant's showing 
of diminution of value to his property."). To be sure, the trial court in Palazzolo decided 
that the original 1983 proposal of Mr. Palazzolo to fill eighteen acres of wetlands would be 
a nuisance, but that conclusion was premised upon the construction of seventy-four septic 
systems, not the proposal to build a beach club, which was the basis of the takings claim. 
212 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). On remand, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court did not find a nuisance. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 
484,486 (S.C. 1992). 
21~ 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); accord Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 
(Wis. 1996). 
214 201 N.W.2d at 768. 
215 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987). 
216 Claridgev. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984). 
217 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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lation as illogica1.218 More significantly, after Lucas was decided, some 
courts have begun to expressly reject the notion that a prohibition on 
filling wetlands can constitute a background principle of state law.219 
This makes some sense, as for many years it was public policy to fill 
wetlands.220 
2. Is the Public Trust Doctrine a Relevant Background Principle? 
When riparian wetlands are at issue, a relevant inquiry is whether 
the proposed use of the wetland interferes with the public trust doc-
trine.221 Public trust rights traditionally have included the right to ac-
cess navigable waterways for fishing and navigation.222 Modern com-
mentators argue that the public trust also includes recreational and 
ecological values.223 Thus, any regulation that would restrict the ability 
of an individual to utilize a private property interest in a resource sub-
ject to the public trust would not have a cause of action for a taking 
because in reality the private property interest never really existed in 
the first place. In fact, some commentators such as Professor Sax posit 
that all property rights should be redefined to make them more akin 
to water rights and subject to an analogous "ecological public trust. "224 
218 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 395 (1988). 
219 See McQueen v. S. C. Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 2000) (rejectingjustand 
the notice rule, but ruling against landowner on "expectations" issue), cert. granted and 
vacated sub nom. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 533 U.S. 943 (2001) 
(remanding to the Supreme Court of South Carolina in light of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606 (2001»; see also supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
220 And, as the dissent in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council suggests, the majority 
holding in Lucas is inconsistent with the just principle. 505 U.S. at 1059 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
221 The public trust doctrine was once only a shorthand way of saying that private indi-
viduals could not impose a stranglehold on the public'S use of and access to navigable 
waterways. Thus, Illinois could not sell the waterfront without first accommodating the 
interest of the public in access to the commons (navigable waterways). See Ill. Cent. R.R. 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452-54 (1892); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 
484 U.S. 469, 481 (1988) (holding the doctrine is not confined only to navigable waters). 
222 See generally Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. 387. For a comprehensive review of the legal and his-
torical origins of the doctrine in the United States, see generally BONNIE]' McCAy, OYS-
TER WARS AND THE PuBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAw, AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 
(1998). 
223 Based on his early writings on the subject, Professor Sax is widely acknowledged as 
being the principle advocate for a modern expansion of the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., 
Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical ShacklRs, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 185 (1980); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970) [hereinafter The Public Trust Doctrine]. 
224 See generally Sax, supra note 4. 
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The Supreme Court's recognition of the public trust doctrine 
dates back to 1892 in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois. 225 Although 
it was originally utilized only as a mechanism to protect public access 
to navigable waterways, academics in recent years have argued in-
tensely over whether the public trust doctrine must "evolve" into an 
all-encompassing ecological easement on all private property, which 
would supposedly limit the reach of the takings doctrine.226 The de-
bate over how far the public trust doctrine should be used to abrogate 
traditional and often centuries old understandings of private property 
rights in land and water is in large part a reflection of competing legal 
philosophies. 
Adherents to more traditional doctrines of free enterprise and 
private property rights see the creation of, and strong protection for, 
private rights in aquatic resources as more efficient and more just 
than a system that would leave the power of redistributing the wealth 
in riparian property to a few judges decreeing the latest expansion of 
the public trust doctrine.227 Professor Cohen cogently argues that 
there is no basis in economics or legal theory for expanding the pub-
lic trust doctrine. In fact, to do so would only destroy our best chances 
of protecting ecological integrity. This is because "the notion of an 
225 See gmerally 146 U.S. 387. 
226 SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 257, 269-70 (1990) (arguing that water rights can be altered or reduced in 
the public interest without the payment of just compensation). See gmerally The Public Trust 
Doctrine, supra note 223. But see gmerally Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 239 (1992) (arguing that the proposed expansions of 
the public trust doctrine are legally and economically insupportable); John S. Harbison, 
Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Property Rights, Public Values, and Instream Waters, 26 LAND & 
WATER L. REv. 535 (1991) (arguing application of the public trust doctrine can lead to a 
taking); James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The 
Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 171 (1987) 
[hereinafter Myth of Public Rights]; James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A 
Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 
DENV. U. L. REv. 565 (1986); Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: 
An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 393 (1991) (critiquing 
Professors Sax and Hoffman and suggesting ecological values are clearly within the public 
trust). 
227 See Myth of Public Rights, supra note 226, at 208-10. James L. Huffman argues that 
"the courts have no capacity to make the kinds of decisions which our Constitution allo-
cates to the legislative branch of government." Id. at 209. Put another way, Huffman is 
concerned that activist courts are better suited to protecting private rights against the tyr-
anny of the majority rather than protecting m:yoritarian public rights by "dredging from 
the depths of the common law waters old doctrines which function to limit private rights." 
Id. 
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evolving unbounded set of communal rights strips clarity, certainty, 
and predictability from the very core of the public trust doctrine. "228 
The definition of private property rights depends on "existing 
rules and understandings, "229 and when we actually rely upon such 
rules and understandings, there is no place for such a transformation 
of property rights. The public trust doctrine should logically have no 
ability to negate the existence of a regulatory taking. As Justice Stew-
art once opined, if a court redefines such existing rules and under-
standings, then ajudicial taking may occur.230 
In short, if a property right was initially created without being 
subject to the modern notions of an expanded public trust, then any 
later imposition of the newly defined public trust carries with it 
significant takings implications. Once a government sees fit to create 
a property right, that right cannot later be abrogated or taken away at 
whim-unless just compensation is paid and there is due process. As 
the United States Supreme Court held over a century ago: 
Under every established government, the tenure of property 
is derived mediately or immediately from the sovereign 
power of the political body, organized in such mode or ex-
erted in such way as the community or State may have 
thought proper to ordain .... It is owing to these character-
istics only ... that appeals can be made to the laws either for 
the protection or assertion of the rights of property. Upon 
any other hypothesis, the law of property would be simply 
the law of force. Now it is undeniable, that the investment of 
property in the citizen by the government, whether made for 
a pecuniary consideration or founded on conditions of civil 
or political duty, is a contract between the State . .. and the 
228 Cohen, supra note 226, at 275. 
229 Bd. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
!!IO See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
("[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking 
property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the 
property it has taken never existed at all. "); see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (dealing with the question of whether the Hawaiian courts' new definition of 
water rights "takes" old existing rights), vacated and remanded on exhaustion of state remedies 
issue, 477 U.S. 902 (1986). But see Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417, 
427 & n.4 (1991) (noting that reserved water rights are protected water rights but that 
courts are not capable of taking property). 
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grantee; and both the parties thereto are bound in good faith to fulfil 
it.231 
For most property, the issue is even more basic because the origin of 
property is usually more fundamental than a contract with govern-
ment; under Lockean principles, it predates the very existence of 
government. 
Thus, even though a government may someday regret that it cre-
ated or recognized the existence of property rights in the past, and 
even though those property rights have become inconvenient to the 
government today, the government is still bound by its prior action of 
creating and divesting property rights. The future, no doubt, will see 
much litigation over the extent of the property interests that were 
originally acquired by individuals and the extent to which they were 
"reserved" to the "public trust." 
VII. DOES THE ACQUISITION OF ALREADY REGULATED PROPERTY 
OBVIATE THE POTENTIAL OF A TAKING BECAUSE THE 
OWNER LACKS INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS? 
A second rationale given by the Rhode Island Supreme Court for 
denying Mr. Palazzolo's claims is that he had no investment-backed 
expectations to utilize his property in a manner that was governed by 
the CRMC regulations.232 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York,233 a landowner's "distinct investment-backed expectation" 
was listed as a factor to consider in determining whether liability at-
taches for a regulatory taking. But it is questionable that Penn Central 
anticipated that notice of a regulatory scheme would eliminate all ex-
pectations of obtaining a permit in the context of a takings chal-
lenge.234 Furthermore, where there is a categorical taking, the role of 
investment-backed expectations should be limited or nonexistent.235 
One need look no further than Penn Central itself, where one of the 
appellants, Union General Properties (UGP), acquired its leasehold 
m W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 532 (1848) (emphasis added); see also Dows 
v. Nat'l Exch. Bank, 91 U.S. 618, 637 (1875) ("[T]he owner of personal property cannot be 
divested of his ownership without his consent, except by process of law."). 
232 Palazzolo v. State ex rei. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.1. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
233 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
234 See infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
235 Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
("When there is ... a regulatory taking that constitutes a total wipeout, investment-backed 
expectations play no role."), reh g en bane denied, 231 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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interest in the Penn Central property after it was designated as a 
landmark.236 Despite the fact that VGP was on "notice," that fact was 
not dispositive. 
Assuming that the Takings Clause is "designed to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," 
the prospect that any landowner (either the original or the new 
owner) can suffer a wipeout of use and value of the property without 
the prospect of the government paying compensation to someone 
should be unsettling.237 When that wipeout rises to the level of taking, 
compensation must be due. Otherwise the State would have acquired 
the development interests at no cost. Government agencies rational-
ize that the owner "knows the rules" when regulated property is ac-
quired. But if the original owner cannot bring a takings claim (be-
cause of an unwillingness or inability to ripen that claim), and if the 
new owner cannot, then who can? Nevertheless, despite the illogic, or 
at least the unfairness, of a rigid application of the notice rule to in-
vestment-backed expectations, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
not been alone. While some courts have focused more on the "title 
theory" of notice, as described in Part VIA supra, others have focused 
more on the relationship between notice and investment-backed ex-
pectations. 
In 1999, the Federal Circuit added a new twist: What matters is 
not the state of the regulatory scheme at the time property is pur-
chased, but what the developer should have anticipated the future regula-
tory regime to be. In Good v. United States,238 Lloyd Good purchased 
property in the Florida Keys in 1973, several months before the adop-
tion of the Endangered Species Act. Good began the odyssey of trying 
to develop his property in 1980.239 At first, Good had no trouble, hav-
ing obtained a dredge and fill permit in 1983.240 This permit was re-
placed with a new but substantially similar permit in 1988.241 He ob-
tained all of his required state permits by 1984,242 and would have 
been able to develop his land at that time but for an appeal brought 
236 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116. 
237 See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992); Agins v. City of 
Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
238 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
239Id. at 1357. 
24°Id. 
241 Id. at 1359. 
242 Id. at 1358. 
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by the Florida Department of Community Affairs. One thing led to 
another, and Good embarked upon a Byzantine series of procedures 
before the state and federal agencies. While trying to renew his wet-
lands permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Lower Keys 
Marsh Rabbit was listed as endangered in 1990, as was the Silver Rice 
Rat in 1991.243 Although the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
recommended alternatives, neither the Corps nor Good acted upon 
the recommendations.244 Instead, Good's permit expired and the 
Corps refused to approve a scaled back permit that Good thought 
would meet with the approval of state regulators.245 Good sued for 
inverse condemnation.246 
After losing before the Court of Federal Claims, the Federal Cir-
cuit upheld the judgment.247 It was persuaded that regardless of 
whether Good had been denied economically viable use of his prop-
erty, he "could not have had a reasonable expectation that he would 
obtain approval to fill ten acres of wetlands in order to develop the 
land. "248 That is because the court concluded that Good was "[s]urely 
. . . not oblivious" to the trend of "rising environmental awareness 
translated into ever-tightening land use regulations. ''249 Another re-
cent federal circuit decision has also ruled that landowners on notice 
of existing regulations may be precluded from bringing regulatory 
takings claims based on the application of those regulations.25o 
Unbowed by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~ the South Carolina Supreme Court 
extended the Good rationale to a landowner who had bought two par-
cels in 1961 and 1963. In McQy,een v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~251 
the court found that even though it was undisputed that a denial of a 
243 [d. at 1359. 
244 Good, 189 F.3d at 1358. 
243 [d. at 1359. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. at 1363. 
248 [d. at 1361-62. 
249 [d. at 1362. 
250 Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999); accord Broadwa-
ter Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154, 156 (1999) (holding that owner 
had actual and constructive knowledge of Clean Water Act of 1972 when property pur-
chased in 1987); see also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (noting that the landowner had purchased before the wetlands regulations were 
adopted). 
251 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 2000), cert. granted and vacated sub nom. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't 
of Health & Envt'l Control, 533 U.S. 943 (2001) (remanding to the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina in light of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001». 
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permit to put in a bulkhead and fill property "deprives respondent of 
all economically viable use of his property, ''252 and that there were no 
"background principles" depriving the owner the right to fill, there 
was no taking.253 Unlike Good, the court did not find that the owner 
was "not oblivious" to the rising tide of environmental regulations in 
the early 1960s.254 Instead, the court did not find a taking because the 
landowner had no investment-backed expectations to develop the 
property-as evidenced by the fact that the owner waited several dec-
ades before attempting to navigate the permitting process, during 
which time there had been some erosion of the property.255 That the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the deci-
sion in light of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island casts a long shadow on the va-
lidity of the state court's holding.256 
However, there have been a number of significant cases where 
courts have reached the opposite conclusion. On February 18, 1997, 
the New York Court of Appeals issued four opinions finding that 
property owners are not entitled to condemnation damages when a 
regulation that results in a taking is adopted prior to the purchase of 
property.257 This holding was applied even to instances where the 
regulation as applied destroyed all use of the property,258 or when the 
City of New York physically invaded private property by dumping 
landfill on a 2400-square foot area.259 Two owners were found to have 
no right to compensation when they were unable to use their land 
because of wetlands restrictions.260 Ironically, while these New York 
252 Id. at 63l. 
mId. at 631-33. 
254 Id. at 634. 
255 See id. 
256 McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envt'l Control, 533 U.S. 943 (2001); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
257 Soon Duck Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y 1997); In reGazza v. N.Y 
State Dep't of Envt'l Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y 1997); In re Anello v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y 1997); Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489 
(N.Y 1997). 
258 See Anello, 678 N.E.2d 870. Anello purchased the property after a steep slope ordi-
nance was adopted. When the application of ordinance and denial of variance precluded 
all use of the lot, Anello was found not to be entitled to takings damages. See generally id. 
259 See generally Soon Duck Kim, 681 N.E.2d 312. Kim purchased a car wash and service 
station after a city passed a charter amendment creating a "duty" to provide lateral support 
for roadways. When road grade was raised owner had duty to sacrifice her land to provide 
lateral support for the raised roadway. See generally id. 
260 See generally Gazz.a, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (purchaser of wetland not entitled to condem-
nation award because when he purchased property he could not have purchased right to 
use wetlands contrary to potential application of regulation); Basile, 678 N.E.2d 489 (when 
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decisions excised from use a segment of the owner's property based 
on the scope of the regulations in place at the time of transfer, the 
United States Supreme Court did the opposite in Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Counci~ Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.261 In rejecting the 
"segmentation" of property according to the scope of the regulations, 
the Court found that "defining the property interest taken in terms of 
the very regulation being challenged is circular. ''262 In other words, 
while the New York courts removed the regulated segments from the 
owners' bundle of sticks, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra insisted 
that the regulated parcel be considered part of the whole parcel. Ei-
ther way, the landowner loses. While Palazzolo may have eliminated 
the ability of government to segment property by accident of post-
regulation acquisition, it is worth noting that the embrace of such a 
rule would have adverse consequences. 
The practical implications of such a rule will be that landowners 
will have a compelling incentive to challenge regulations whenever 
they are passed and that regulated property will become increasingly 
difficult to sell.263 In addition, property interests will be balkanized to 
the extent that neighboring landowners will own potentially very dif-
ferent property interests, depending on when each neighbor pur-
chased property in relation to the regulations. In time, as regulations 
ratchet down on the rights to use property, and as owners are unable 
to bring ripe challenges to the regulations and must sell their land, 
the State will acquire an ever enlarging regulatory servitude over pri-
vate property. 
In City of Virginia Beach v. BeI~264 a residential lot was acquired 
from a corporation by a fifty percent shareholder in the corporation. 
Like the Rhode Island court in Palazzolo, the Virginia Supreme Court 
held there was no taking, because the acquisition occurred after the 
adoption of a local dune protection ordinance, and therefore the new 
owner did not acquire any right to develop the property in a manner 
contrary to the ordinance.265 
city condemned wetlands parcel it only had to pay nominal fair market value because 
owner did not have right to put property to its highest and best use; the land was pur-
chased after wetlands regulations were adopted). 
261 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
262 Id. at 1483. See also the discussion in Part VIII.B infra. 
263 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Mass. 1994) (finding that rule 
prohibiting purchaser from challenging existing regulations would have adverse policy 
impacts). 
264 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998). 
265 Id. at 417-18. 
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But other states and the Ninth Circuit have rejected, years before 
Palazzolo, this application of the notice rule-often without specific 
reference to either the "title theory" or the "investment-backed expec-
tations theory. "266 For example, New Jersey recently held in Karam v. 
Statff.67 that "the right of a property owner to fair compensation when 
his property is zoned into inutility by changes in the zoning law passes 
to the next owner despite the latter's knowledge. "268 The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson found that an as-
applied but not a facial takings challenge can be brought by a pur-
chaser of regulated property.269 Likewise, in Del Monte Dunes at Mon-
terey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey,270 the Ninth Circuit allowed a landowner's 
takings claims to proceed despite the fact that land was purchased 
with knowledge of permitting requirements.271 In Florida, the court in 
Vatalaro v. Department of Environmental Regulation272 held that even 
though a property owner acquired land after a regulatory scheme was 
adopted, she could still pursue an as-applied takings claim.273 The 
court reasoned that no taking occurred until after the State denied 
the landowner's permit application when the State determined the 
property was suitable only for limited passive recreational use.274 
Finally, the Supreme Court's treatment of the relationship be-
tween the "notice rule" and the "investment-backed expectations 
prong" of Penn Central is a bit inconclusive. As discussed previously, 
the Court rejected outright the idea that the existence of a regulation 
266 See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled 
on a different holding Uy WXM Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); Vatalaro v. 
Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Karam v. State, 
705 A.2d 1221 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), afl'd, 723 A.2d 943 (NJ. 1999). 
267 705 A.2d 1221. 
266 [d. at 1229. 
269 37 F.3d at 47&-77. 
270 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996), afl'd, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
271 See id. 
272 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In State, Department of Environmental 
Protection v. Burgess, the court declined to follow the "flawed" reasoning of Vatalaro, holding 
that even though Burgess purchased property before the wetlands regulations were 
adopted, he had no reasonable investment-backed expectations to develop this remote 
and isolated parcel. See 772 So. 2d 540, 542 n.l (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), appeal denied sub 
nom. Burgess v. State, 791 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2001) (table decision), cert. denied sub nom. Fla. 
Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, 122 S. Ct. 615 (2001). 
m Vatalaro, 601 So. 2d at 1229. 
274 See id; see also Cottonwood Farms v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 763 P.2d 551, 555 
(Colo. 1988) ("The majority of courts have held that the fact of prior purchase with 
knowledge of applicable zoning regulations does not preclude a property owner from 
challenging the validity of the regulations on constitutional grounds, but does constitute a 
factor .... "). 
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affects the "background principles" of property.275 It also noted that 
on remand the court need not discuss the notice rule and back-
ground principles in connection with the claim that all economic use 
was deprived; it must address, however, the merits of petitioner's 
claim under Penn Central.276 
But the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, in this five to 
four decision, states that Palazzolo's "holding does not mean that the 
timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title 
is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis"277 and that "the regulatory 
regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue 
helps to shape the reasonableness of ... expectations."278 Justice 
O'Connor did, however, criticize the Rhode Island court for elevating 
such expectations to "dispositive status" because then the "State wields 
far too much power to redefine property rights upon passage of ti-
tle. "279 Justice Scalia, however, in his concurrence, was emphatic that 
notice of preexisting regulations should play no part in a Penn Central 
analysis: 
[T] he fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser 
took title . . . should have no bearing upon the determina-
tion of whether the restriction is so substantial as to consti-
tute a taking. The "investment-backed expectations" that the 
law will take into account do not include the assumed valid-
ity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much 
of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that a 
Penn Central taking ... no less than a total taking, is not ab-
solved by the transfer of title. 280 
Thus, while there is still some room for debate over the extent to 
which notice of a preexisting regulation informs investment-backed 
expectations, there is no debate over whether such notice affects un-
derlying title to the extent that a new landowner cannot pursue a 
challenge to the application of a regulation. 
275 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 V.S. 606. 629-30 (2001). 
276 [d. at 630. 
277 [d. at 633 (O·Connor.].. concurring). 
278 [d. (O·Connor.].. concurring).Justice O'Connor's focus on the continuing impor-
tance of investment-backed expectations was adopted by the Court in its dicta in Tahoe-
Sierra. See 122 S. Ct. 1465. 1486 (2002). 
279 Palazzolo. 533 V.S. at 635 (O·Connor.].. concurring). 
280 [d. at 637 (Scalia.J .• concurring) (citations omitted). 
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VIII. How MUCH USE AND VALUE OF PROPERTY CAN 
GOVERNMENT DESTROY BEFORE IT IS LIABLE 
FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION? 
47 
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Mr. Palazzolo alleged his property 
would have been worth $3.1 million had he been allowed to fill in the 
wetlands.281 While the government disputed that figure, it further 
claimed that because the property had a value of $200,000 if a small 
upland portion could be developed, or a value of $157,000 as an open 
space gift, then there could be no taking.282 The question of how far is 
"too far" remains one of the more vexing issues in the law of regula-
tory takings. It had been hoped that the Supreme Court would pro-
vide some guidance in answering the question: Whether the remain-
ing permissible uses of regulated property are economically viable 
merely because the property retains a value greater than zero. Unfor-
tunately, other than holding that the remaining $200,000 value was 
too much to be considered a categorical taking, the Court did not 
reach the issue of partial takings. 
A. What Occurs If a Portion of the Land Has Already Been Developed' What 
Is the Relevant Parcel in a Takings Ana~sis? 
An owner of multiple parcels who has fewer than the total num-
ber "taken" by regulation, or an owner of one large tract who has only 
a portion taken by a permit denial, naturally wants to be compensated 
for a taking, just as the owner of a tract where only a portion has been 
physically invaded wants compensation. The government, on the 
other hand, wants to claim that since the owner still has something of 
value left, there has been no taking in the constitutional sense. Such 
considerations are squarely addressed in the Supreme Court's discus-
sion of the relevant parcel in Lucas: 
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to 
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear 
whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the 
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use 
of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the 
281 Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
282 [d. at 715. 
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owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as 
a whole.283 
Similarly, in Palazzolo, Mr. Palazzolo is unable to utilize eighteen acres 
of wetlands. He may, however, be able to use a few additional acres of 
uplands.284 This presents the question: Have the wetlands been taken, 
or is there enough remaining upland to absolve the government of 
liability? This has been referred to as the "denominator problem. "285 
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,286 the federal circuit up-
held an award of $2.6 million in compensation for the denial of a 
Army Corps of Engineers' dredge and fill permit to develop 12.5 acres 
ofwetland.287 Among other arguments, the government asserted that 
because the owner of the property had successfully developed a sub-
stantial portion of the 250 acres he originally owned, no taking should 
be found. 288 The government reasoned that the owner recouped a 
substantial portion of his original investment-backed expectations 
from when he first purchased the property in the late 1950s.289 The 
court did not agree.290 Instead, it examined the actual property owned 
at the time of the alleged taking and declined to reach back in time to 
look at property that once might have been owned by the same owner, 
even if contiguous to the taken property.291 
283 Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
284 Tavares, 746 A2d at 710 n.l. 
285 "[ 0 1 ne of the critical questions in determining how to define the unit of property 
'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.'" Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Praperty, 
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REv. 1165, 1192 (1967». 
Id. 
286 28 F.3d U7l (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
287Id. at 1178, 1183. 
286 Id. at 1180. 
289 Id. As the Federal Circuit observed in Loveladies Harbur, Inc. v. United States: 
If the tract of land that is the measure of the economic value after the regula-
tory imposition is defined as only that land for which the use permit is de-
nied, that provides the easiest case for those arguing that a categorical taking 
occurred. On the other hand, if the tract of land is defined as some larger 
piece, one with substantial residuary value independent of the wetlands regu-
lation, then either a partial or no taking occurred .... This is the denomina-
tor problem. 
290 Id. at 1181. 
291Id. 
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Earlier, however, in Ciampitti v. United States,292 the Claims Court 
declined to find a taking because the property owner had already de-
veloped some of his land, and he also retained some property that was 
not impacted by wetlands regulations.293 Furthermore, the court 
found that the property owner's argument that he could rely on a 
loophole in property law to allow him to develop land without a per-
mit was not a reasonable investment-backed expectation.294 
In Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, the trial court found 
some significance to the fact that the property was purchased in the 
1950s and partially sold off in 1968.295 On appeal, however, the court 
found that the trial court erred by focusing on only the history of the 
purchase and sale in relation to the relevant statutory scheme.296 In-
stead, it found that other "factual nuances" should be analyzed, in-
cluding the developer's plans and the geographic connection be-
tween the lots.297 The Federal Circuit has also considered the issue in 
292 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-19 (1991). 
293 Id. at 320. As to whether a taking had occurred, the court observed: 
Factors such as the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to 
which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, the extent to which the 
protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands, and no doubt many 
others would enter the calculus. The effect of a taking can obviously be dis-
guised if the property at issue is too broadly defined. Conversely, a taking can 
appear to emerge if the property is viewed too narrowly. The effort should be 
to identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possible, given the entire fac-
tual and regulatory environment. 
Id. at 318-19. 
mId. at 320. 
295 42 Fed. Cl. 340 (1998), vacated, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000), a/I'd, 231 F.3d 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), reh'g en banc denied, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The trial court found 
of some significance the purchase of the property after the adoption of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. § 403 (2001). See id. at 361. But on appeal the Federal Cir-
cuit rejected this theory, finding that the existence of navigational servitude does not de-
feat takings claim because the permit was not denied in order to protect navigation. See 
208 F.3d at 1385-86. 
296 208 F.3d at 1381. 
297 Id. The court found that: 
The regulatory imposition that infected the development plans for the 50.7 
acres was unrelated to [Palm Beach Isles Associates'] plans for and disposi-
tion of the 261 acres of beachfront upland on the east side of the road. The 
development of that property was physically and temporally remote from, and 
legally unconnected to, the 50.7 acres of wetlands and submerged lake bed 
on the lake side of the spit. Combining the two tracts for purposes of the 
regulatory takings analysis involved here, simply because at one time they 
were under common ownership, or because one of the tracts sold for a sub-
stantial price, cannot be justified. 
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Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United StateSl.98 and Forest Properties, Inc. v. United 
States. 299 
In East Cape May Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection, the appellate division of the New Jersey Superior Court re-
cently discussed at length the ways that various states have determined 
the relevant parcel in takings analyses.3OO The State argued that sepa-
rate large parcels owned by the same principals who owned the af-
fected wetland parcel should be considered together for the purpose 
of a takings analysis.301 The court remanded for further analysis of the 
nature of the ownership interests, the zoning of the various parcels, 
and when the other parcels had been built on and disposed of.302 
B. What Occurs If Only a Portion of an Owner's Undeveloped 
Property Is Taken? 
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned against segmen-
tation of larger units of property for takings purposes.303 However, as 
the Court pointed out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~ there 
may be circumstances where the total holdings of the landowner may 
not be the relevant parcel304 Some commentators have lumped vari-
ous manifestations of the "segmentation" of property under the rubric 
of "conceptual severance. "305 Such severance can occur by parcel or 
Id. 
298 See 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that it would not consider every lot 
where a permit had been denied as a separate parcel; otherwise every permit denial would 
result in a taking). 
299 See 177 F.3d 1360, 1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (joining together nine acres of sub-
merged lakebed with a sixty-two-acre tract of upland that the owner had already sold, as 
part of single development scheme). 
300 See generally 693 A.2d 114 (N J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
solId. at 119. 
so2Id. at 128-29. 
SO~ See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
V.S. 602, 643-44 (1993). Although this was a pension liability case, unrelated to real prop-
erty, the Court concluded that the relevant question is whether the property taken is all or 
only a portion of the whole. Id. at 644; Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 V.S. 
104, 138 (1978) (finding that air rights over train station not considered a separate par-
cel). 
!104 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 V.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
S05 See, e.g., MargaretJane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676-77 (1988). Conceptual severance 
refers to the division of property into its component parts in accord with common law 
principles of interests in property. See id. at 1676. Some criticize the idea of conceptual 
severance, suggesting that all such interests should be lumped together in a takings analy-
sis. See id. at 1676-77. 
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lot (horizontal segmentation), by time (temporal segmentation), or 
by height (vertical segmentation) .306 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agmry, however, the Court empha-
sized the need to look to the "parcel as a whole," and rejected such 
"conceptual severance," at least for temporal severance.307 This idea-
that landowners receive compensation when property interests are 
taken through regulation-is inimical to these commentators. There-
fore, they suggest, instead, that courts lump every conceivable interest 
in a property together, horizontally, vertically, and across time, 
thereby making the taking of any economically viable use less than 
likely.308 Professor Eagle, in turn, criticizes this notion of lumping, de-
riding it as "conceptual agglomeration. "309 Indeed, fears of conceptual 
severance are little more valid than a child's fear of the bogeyman. 
For centuries the common law has promoted carving out discrete in-
terests in property to maximize its utility. Whether it be the subdivi-
sion of large estates, the creation of leasehold interests for a limited 
duration of time, or the independent sale of mineral rights, severance 
is an essential core of Anglo-American conceptions of property. From 
Locke's application of his "labor theory," to the creation of interests 
in property, to more recent utilitarian approaches to the theory of 
property, a hallmark of every such theoretical conception is that 
property is divisible, with discrete interests controlled by discrete enti-
ties. There is little to fear if courts were to recognize this tradition in 
modern times. In other words, there is no reason in law or logic for 
the courts to treat property any differently in the context of regula-
tory takings. 
Happily for litigators and law review authors the treatment of this 
issue in the state and lower federal courts has been mixed, hopelessly 
contradictory, and defiant of synthesis. The inconsistency of the lower 
courts may be a function of some courts' predilection towards favor-
ing government over landowners, or vice versa, a predilection that 
some would equate to "fairness. "310 In the array of cases listed below, 
306 See Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatury Takings: A Biological and 
Cultural Analysis, 1 U. PA.]. CONST. L. 20, 36 (1998) ("In the vertical dimension, the rele-
vant parcel is viewed columnally from the depths of the earth to the heights of the sky."). 
~7 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483 (2002). 
~8 [d. 
309 STEVEN]' EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 64(c) (2) (iii) (1996). 
~lO See Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L. 
REv. 9, 19 (1997) (recognizing the inability of courts to apply a consistent theory of seg-
mentation, this commentator suggests abandoning segmentation theory in favor of "fair-
ness"). 
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an advocate for either the government or the private landowner will 
have plenty of case law for support. What practitioners will lack is any 
sort of consistent treatment in the lower courts that they can point to 
in arguing what the relevant parcel should be in any particular case. 
1. Some Courts Have Refused to Look at Restricted Parcels or 
Portions of Parcels Separately 
Recently, the court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agenry refused to find a temporary taking where a 
large number of properties had been subject to several moratoria, 
which denied all use and value to the properties for over twenty 
years.311 Previously, the trial court found that one particular morato-
rium took all economically viable use for that period of time.312 
Other courts have also declined to treat separately those portions 
of a single parcel that are regulated differently. For instance, in Zealy 
v. City of Waukesha,313 the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that 
all the property owned by landowners would be considered for takings 
purposes; it declined to look only at the portion allegedly zoned into 
inutility by the city's actions.314 
In K & K Construction, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, the 
Michigan Supreme Court combined both separate parcels and differ-
ently regulated portions of the same parcel.315 The court combined a 
fifty-five acre parcel, of which between twenty-seven and twenty-eight 
acres were untouchable because of wetlands, with two other parcels of 
sixteen and 3.4 acres, for purposes of determining whether there was 
a taking.316 The court reasoned that the parcels were owned in whole 
or in part by the same owner of the fifty-five-acre parcel.317 The Michi-
gan example was followed in Karam v. State,318 where the appellate 
court examined the title history of a lot comprised upland and wet-
m 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483 (2002). 
312 See id. 
m 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996). 
314 See id. at 533. 
315 575 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Mich. 1998); see also Volkema v. Dep't of Natural Res., 542 
N.W.2d 282 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), a/I'd in part, disapprlYVed in part, 586 N.W.2d 231 (Mich. 
1998) (table decision). 
316 See 575 N.W.2d at 534, 537-38. 
m See id. at 537. The court remanded the case to determine whether a separate 9.6-
acre parcel should be combined, and, if combined, whether the destruction of the use and 
value of the twenty-seven or twenty-eight acres out of the whole constituted a taking. [d. at 
540. 
318 723 A.2d 943 (N J. 1999). 
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land sections and found the two portions to be a single unit for tak-
ings analysis purposes. 
In District Intown Properties Ltd v. District of Columbia,319 the District 
of Columbia Circuit found that nine lots would be considered to-
gether because the units were originally held together and the devel-
oper planned to develop them as a single project.320 A concurring 
opinion objected, calling for, among other things, the type of test de-
scribed by a lower court in Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Common-
wealth, Department of Natural Resources.321 However, reference to Ma-
chipongo is unavailing as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, 
finding that the entirety of a coal deposit must be considered in a tak-
ings analysis, not just the coal within a protected watershed. In doing 
so the court cited to Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis for its 
rejection of vertical severance (of the mineral estate) 322 and to Tahoe-
Sierra for the rejection of temporal severance.323 The court remanded 
the case on the issue of horizontal severance, instructing the trial 
court to examine various factors dealing with the property's history, as 
set forth in Loveladies Harbor. 324 
2. Other Courts Have Treated Regulated Portions of Property as the 
Takings Denominator 
However, other courts have been more willing to look at just 
those parcels or portions of a single parcel that are affected by the 
regulation. In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 325 the Oregon Su-
preme Court found that a timber company stated a claim for inverse 
condemnation when fifty-six acres of old-growth redwood timber were 
set aside within a sixty-four-acre parcel in order to protect the habitat 
m 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
~20 Id. at 876-77. 
321 Id. at 889 (Williams, j., concurring) (citing John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the 
Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1535, 1557-58 (1994». See gen-
erally Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Natural Res., 719 
A.2d 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded by 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 
2002), petition/or cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 27, 2002) (No. 02-321). 
~22 799 A.2d at 766-68. 
S23 Id. at 768. 
~24 Id. (citing Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994». 
~25 935 P.2d 411 (Or. 1997). In a subsequent decision, the same court found the tak-
ings claim was not ripe. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563, 574 (Or. Ct. App. 
1999), appeal denied sub nom. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 18 P.3d 1099 (Or. 
2000) (table decision), cert. denied sub nom. Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex reL Or. State Bd. 
of Forestry, 532 U.S. 923 (2001). 
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of the Northern Spotted Ow1.326 Similarly, in Twain Harte Associates, 
Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne,327 a California Court of Appeal looked only 
to property subject to the same zoning constraints in a takings analy-
sis.328 Likewise, in American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin,329 
the Ninth Circuit broke property into two segments for a takings 
analysis because the county had zoned and regulated each portion 
differently.33o The New York Court of Appeals applied "conceptual 
severance" to the regulation of single room occupancy hotel rooms in 
Seawall Associates v. City of New York.331 Finally, in Mekuria v. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,332 the trial court had no trouble 
segmenting separate developed parcels where they were subject to 
separate leases and were not physically contiguous.333 
Perhaps the most elegant model for analyzing the takings de-
nominator was proposed by John Fee who suggested that "any 
identifiable segment of land is a parcel for purposes of regulatory tak-
ings analysis if prior to regulation it could have been put to at least 
one economically viable use, independent of the surrounding land 
segments. "334 In other words, if government imposes a small setback 
requirement on a property, it would not likely be a taking so long as 
the setback could not be used in a manner economically independent 
of the larger parcel. However, if the setback is large enough, then 
there may very well be takings implications. This test was adopted by a 
Pennsylvania appellate court in Machipongo,335 but on appeal the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case for more factual 
analysis concerning whether the history of the parcel supported treat-
ing land declared unsuitable for mining as a separate parcel. 336 
326 Boise Cascade Corp. v. Bd. of Forestry, 935 P.2d 411, 414, 415-16 (Or. 1997). 
327 217 Cal. App. 3d 71, 85-88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
328 See id. But see Ramona Convent of the Holy Names v. City of Alhambra, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 140, 145 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no taking of 1.97-acres of a 19.17-acre par-
cel). 
329 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981). 
330 Id. at 366-67. 
m 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1060-61 (N.Y 1989). 
332 45 F. Supp. 2d 19,31 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding a taking when a construction project 
prevented reasonable access to parcels). 
333 Id. at 30. 
334 Fee, supra note 321, at 1557. This analysis enables courts to make a rational distinc-
tion between small setbacks and more significant amounts ofland. 
335 719 A.2d 19, 28 n.22 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded l!y 
799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002). 
336 Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Natural Res., 799 
A.2d 751, 768 (Pa. 2002). 
2002] PalazoUo and Private Rights 55 
3. Where Will the Supreme Court Land on the Denominator Issue? 
As noted, in both Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 
and Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers 
Pension Trust the Court warned against the segmentation of property 
in a takings analysis.55'7 However, Concrete Pipe did not involve real 
property, and Penn Central dealt with a rather unique fact situation 
where the landowner had already conceded the viability of transfer-
ring the development rights in the air rights.5!l8 Furthermore, too 
much should not be read into Penn Centrals warning about segmenta-
tion because the Lucas Court expressly rejected as "extreme" and "un-
supportable" the notion advocated by the New York Court of Appeals 
in Penn Centra~ SSg namely examining "the diminution in a particular 
parcel's value ... in light of total value of the taking claimant's other 
holdings in the vicinity. "540 
Significantly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed a great deal of interest in this question. At oral argument, the 
Court repeatedly asked counsel about whether Mr. Palazzolo's eight-
een acres of wetlands should be treated separately from the small up-
land portion of his property.541 However, finding that the issue had 
$57 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,137 (1978); supra note 
303 and accompanying text. 
~58 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. 
~59 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277-78 (N.Y. 1977), 
affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
MO Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
341 For example, there was this exchange between the Attorney General of the State of 
Rhode Island and the Court: 
QUESTION: Is it-is it your position, General Whitehouse, if someone has, 
say a section of land, a square mile, either-a square mile. And picks out a 10-
acre plot at one edge of that and applies for zoning use and claims that it's 
denied, he claims to have been denied all economic use. That the fact that he 
has a remaining everything square mile minus 10 acres means that that has to 
be taken into consideration, too? 
GENERAL WIllTEHOUSE: Yes, I think it is, Your Honor. 
QUESTION: I don't think our cases support that. 
GENERAL WIllTEHOUSE: Well, the most recent-I would go back to, for 
instance, at the earliest expression the Penn Central case, which used the term 
parcel-as-a-whole and from which the parcel-as-a-whole discussion has 
emerged and then most recently injustice Scalia's concurring opinion in the 
Suitum [v. Talwe Regional Planning Agmcy, 520 U.S. 725 (1997),] decision, you 
referred to the relevant property as the aggregation of all the owners prop-
erty subject to the regulation at least those that are contiguous. 
QUESTION: We don't generally get our law out of concurring opinions. 
GENERAL WHITEHOUSE: That's correct, Your Honor. But I believe-
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not been squarely presented to it, it declined to reach it.342 Nor did 
the Court address the segmentation issue that arose from the fact that 
there were already seventy-four subdivided lots on Mr. Palazzolo's 
eighteen-plus acres.343 
The Court in Palazzolo "expressed discomfort with the logic of 
this rule" and cited to the analysis by Fee discussed in the preceding 
section.344 The Court in Tahoe-Sierra seemingly embraced the "parcel 
as a whole" rule, at least with respect to temporal severance. The 
question remains open as to whether the government can take eight-
een acres of Mr. Palazzolo's property without compensation because 
he can use one-tenth of an acre, why not take 999 acres of lOOO-acre 
plot, and so on? One would hope that the takings clause is not so 
fickle as to be transformed into a rule that the more one owns the 
more the government can take without paying compensation. 
C. lVhat Occurs If Only a Portion of the Value of Property Is Taken? 
In footnote eight of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas,345 Jus-
tice Scalia suggests that even if some use and value remained in a 
QUESTION: But in the Chief's hypothetical, what if he then sells off all ex-
cept the 100acre plot and then reapplies, and the 1O-acre plot is again denied 
to development, then there's been a taking. It's such a silly result. There is 
not in the first case, because he hasn't yet sold off the rest of the one square 
mile, but if he sells off the rest of the one square mile, and makes the very 
same application, gets the very same result, then there's been a taking. That 
seems to me very strange. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-
2047),2001 WI.. 196990, at *29-30 (Feb. 26, 2001) (italics added). 
342 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001). Indeed, the issue of the 
denominator was not included in the questions presented, and only raised by counsel for 
Mr. Palazzolo in the brief on the merits as an analog to the doctrine of physical invasions, 
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note IS, at *45, and when responding to an amicus 
brief that suggested no compensation is due whenever anything of value remains on the 
property. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, 2001 WI.. 57593, at *19, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047). 
343 See generally Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606. 
344 Id. at 631 (citing Fee, supra note 321). The Palazzolo majority further stated: "Some 
of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is meas-
ured against the value of the parcel as a whole ... ; but we have at times expressed discom-
fort with the logic of this rule, ... a sentiment echoed by some commentators." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
In TaJwe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. u Talwe Regional Planning Agent)', the Court 
backtracked a bit, restating in dicta the parcel-as-a-whole rule as articulated in cases like 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), and Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Con-
struction Laboreres Pension Trust, 50S U.S. 602 (1993). See 122 S. Ct. 1465, 14S1-83 (2002). 
345 SeeLucasv. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.S (1992). 
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regulated parcel there might still be a taking. In his dissent, Justice 
Stevens criticized the Lucas categorical rule, wherein a total depriva-
tion of use and value is a taking, because, he felt, landowners who 
were just a few steps short of a total deprivation would not recover 
under the rule.346 The majority, however, countered that "[t]his analy-
sis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one 
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation. "347 In other 
words, if the use and value of the property has been completely de-
stroyed, there has been a compensable taking. If there is some resid-
ual use or value, however, the landowner is left with a opportunity to 
utilize a Penn Central analysis to determine whether there has been a 
"partial" taking.348 
The idea that a taking can occur even when there is some value 
remaining in the property has a certain equitable appeal. As the 
Court of Federal Claims put it: 
The notion that the government can take two thirds of your 
property and not compensate you but must compensate you 
if it takes 100% has a ring of irrationality, if not unfairness, 
about it. If the law said that those injured by tortious con-
duct could only have their estates compensated if they were 
killed, but not themselves if they could still breathe, no mat-
ter how seriously injured, we would certainly think it odd, if 
not barbaric. Yet in takings trials, we have the government 
trying to prove that the patient has a few breaths left, while 
the plaintiffs seek to prove, often at great expense, that the 
patient is dead. This all-or-nothing approach seems to ignore 
the point of the Takings Clause.349 
This issue was brought to the forefront in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. 
United States.350 In that case, a mining company was awarded $1.02 mil-
lion after it could not obtain a permit needed to mine ninety-eight 
acres of limestone in a wetland.351 On appeal, however, the govern-
ment argued that there was no taking because it alleged the property 
346 Seeid. at 1064 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
M7 [d. at 1019 n.8. 
'46 See id. at 1015-19 nn.6-8. 
M9 Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 23-24 (1999). 
350 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), judgment entered by 23 Cl. Ct. 653 (1991), vacated and remanded 
by 18 F.3d. 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
351 See id. at 176. 
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retained significant value despite the wetlands regulations.352 This was 
based on an allegation that a speculator in Arizona made an offer to 
buy the property shortly after the permit was denied.353 This sort of 
argument, of course, is contrary to the government's usual position in 
condemnation cases, because the government now appears to be ar-
guing that speculative value of property should be considered in a 
takings case.354 
In 1994, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision 
in the appeal of Florida Rock. 355 It is recommended reading for anyone 
dealing with the issue of the valuation of a regulated wetland and the 
existence of a "partial" taking. The court ruled that the trial court had 
improperly dismissed the relevance of an offer to buy the property, 
despite the fact that the offer may have been made without a proper 
appreciation of the impact of the regulatory impediments on develop-
ing the property.356 The court, however, continued that even if the 
property retained some value-based in part on speculation-there 
still might be a "partial" taking.357 It instructed the trial court to weigh 
the various factors articulated in Penn Centraf>58 in order to determine 
whether there was a taking.359 This decision represents an unequivocal 
embrace ofthe doctrine of partial takings.360 On remand to the Court 
of Federal Claims, Chief Judge Smith found that a seventy-three per-
cent diminution in value of the property, when analyzed in light of 
other Penn Central factors such as the inflation-adjusted investment, 
constituted a taking of the ninety-eight acres.361 In Walcek v. United 
States,362 the Court of Federal Claims found that a diminution in value 
of 59.7% did not constitute a taking, categorical or otherwise. It also 
suggested that Chief Judge Smith's Florida Rock opinion, in that it ana-
lyzed other investment related factors, was "disharmonious" with the 
Supreme Court precedent.363 In a subsequent decision in the Florida 
352 See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
353 See id. at 1563. 
354 See discussion infra Part II. 
355 18 F.3d 1560, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
356 See id. at 1565-66. 
357 See id. at 1568-69. 
358 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
359 See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
360 But seeClajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1577 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
the partial takings analysis of Flurida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994), in the context of an alleged taking of big game hunting rights). 
361 Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 43-44 (1999). 
362 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271-72 (2001). 
363 See id. at 271 n.37. 
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Rock line of cases, Chief Judge Smith held that the entire 1500-acre 
parcel had been taken, finding it pointless to require the landowner 
to go through the permitting process on the remainder.364 
There was a substantial takings award in Formanek v. United 
States,365 a case involving a calcareous fen bog wetlands, where the 
Court of Federal Claims found that a taking occurred when the Army 
Corps of Engineers denied a dredge and fill permit.366 The Court of 
Federal Claims rejected the government's arguments that the prop-
erty could not be developed under state or locallaw.367 It also rejected 
the argument that the development would constitute a nuisance be-
cause there was no "extreme threat to public health. "368 Because the 
permit denial reduced the fair market value from $933,921 to 
$112,000, the government was ordered to pay compensation of 
$933,921, plus interest.369 This is notable because the court found a 
taking in spite of the fact that some value, albeit a dramatically re-
duced value, remained in the property.370 
In a somewhat odd decision, 0 'Connor v. Corps of Engineer871 the 
court was asked to decide whether the denial of a permit to place fill 
on a wetland for a tennis court was a taking.372 Mter noting that it 
probably did not have jurisdiction to rule on the takings issue (which 
it did not), the court went on to speculate that the action was .not a 
taking.373 The court crafted its own formulation of a regulatory tak-
ing, finding that a "taking occurs when a consideration of fairness and 
justice dictates that the economic impact of the regulation on the 
owner and the owner's distinct investment backed expectations far 
outweigh any benefit to the public that the regulation is designed to 
promote. "374 However, the court found no taking because the loss of 
the tennis court was not a denial of all use of the property and did not 
outweigh the benefit to the public from protecting the wetlands.375 
~ No. 26tH!2 L, 2000 WL 331830 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 28,2000). 
!!65 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 332 (1992). The federal government declined to appeal this award. 
!166 [d. at 341. 
367 [d. at 337. 
!166 See id. at 340. 
369 [d. at 341. 
~70 See id. at 340. 
m 801 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
S72 See id. at 187. 
m See id. at 197-98. 
~74 [d. at 198. 
mSeeid. 
60 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:1 
More recently, in Karam v. State,376 a New Jersey appellate court 
found that the denial of a permit to develop riparian property was not 
a taking because, when considered as a whole, some value remained 
in an upland section of the property. 377 
A few cases have found that landowners have not proved a taking 
when the land retains some residual recreational value, reasoning that 
the owners never had any "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions" to further develop the property. In a cursory opinion, the 
Maine Supreme Court held in Wyer v. Board of Environmental Protec-
tion,378 that the existence of potential recreational uses such as park-
ing, picnics, and barbecues, were enough "value" to obviate a taking 
claim.379 Similarly, in State, Department of Environmental Protection v. Bur-
gess,380 a Florida appellate court found no taking because, although 
the owner could not erect a tent platform, he could still use the prop-
erty for recreational purposes, namely "nature walks and fishing. "381 
While footnote eight of Lucas and the experience of some lower 
courts would seem to have taken care of Justice Stevens' argument 
that the existence of some small value will always obviate a takings 
claim, some commentators continue to suggest that Lucas makes it 
harder for a court to find a taking.382 Such arguments usually note the 
unique factual setting of Lucas, where the South Carolina Court of 
Common Pleas found that there was no value to Mr. Lucas' prop-
erty.383 From this fact the thesis is propounded that a taking was found 
in that case only because there was no value remaining in the prop-
erty. Furthermore, because all land must have some value, it will be 
next to impossible for a court to find any regulatory taking in the fu-
ture. Taking this syllogism one step further, critics continue by sug-
gesting that except for those "no-value" cases, that leaves only a "nega-
tive implication" wherein courts will presume no taking if some value 
376 705 A.2d 1221 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff'd, 723 A.2d 943 (NJ. 1999). 
377 See id. at 1228. See also East Cape May Associates v. State, New Jersey Department. of Envi-
ronmentalProtection, 693 A.2d 114, 124-29 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), for a particularly 
detailed discussion of the relevant parcel issue. 
378 747 A.2d 192 (Me. 2000). 
379 See id. at 193-94. 
380 772 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), appeal denied sub nom. Burgess v. State, 791 
So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2001) (table decision), cert. denied sub nom. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. 
Burgess, 122 S. Ct. 615 (2001). 
381 Id. at 543. 
382 See, e.g., DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK 196-204 
(2000). 
383 Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). 
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remains.384 But this argument ignores the emphasis the Lucas court 
placed on the use of property, as the opinion repeatedly uses language 
such as "beneficial use" or "productive use. "385 The only time it dis-
cusses value is in the context of the facts of the case and not as an in-
dispensable element of a takings claim.386 
Whatever doubts about the existence of residual value that may 
have remained after Lucas should have been dispelled in Palazzolo. 
~84 See, e.g., Richard]. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 
1411, 1427 (1993) ("Instead, the negative implication of the category's nonapplicability 
will dominate the lower courts' takings analyses. These courts will likely apply the opposite 
presumption that no taking has occurred."). This is also, of course, what the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court essentially did in Palazzow when it concluded its evaluation of economic 
impact upon finding that some value remained in the property. See Palazzolo v. State ex reL 
Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); see also Plantation Landing Resort, Inc. v. United 
States, 30 Fed. CI. 63, 69 (1993) (finding that the court need not explore other factors 
referred to in Penn Central and later cases because there was no denial of economically 
viable use), affd, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (table decision). 
lI85 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012 (finding that "temporary deprivations of use are com-
pensable"); id. at 1013 (commenting on "beneficial use of ... land"); id. at 1014 ("If, in-
stead, the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification 
under the police power, 'the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private property disappeared.'" (quoting Pa. Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922»; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (finding "categorical 
treatment appropriate where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive 
use of land"); id. at 1016 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 
'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an (JUJTU!T economically viable 
use of his land'" (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980» (emphasis added»; 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.6 (commenting on "economically beneficial use of ... land"); id. 
at 1016 n. 7, 1017 (stating that "deprivation of all economically feasible use" and "all eco-
nomically beneficial use" and "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's 
point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation") (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,652 (1981) (Brennan,]., dissenting»; Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1018 (discussing "all economically beneficial uses" of land and "economically 
beneficial or productive options for its use"); id. at 1019 (commenting on "preventing 
developmental uses" and concluding that to "sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in 
the name of the common good, that is, to leave ... property economically idle" would 
result in a taking); id. at 1027 (discussing "all economically beneficial use" ofland); id. at 
1030 (discussing "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land"); id. at 
1031 (noting that although "common-law principles would have prevented the erection of 
any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land; they rarely support prohi-
bition of the 'essential use' ofland"). 
386 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007 (stating that regulation has a "dramatic effect on the eco-
nomic value"); id. at 1016 n.7 (discussing property interest "against which the loss of value 
is to be measured" and concluding that it is "unclear whether we would analyze the situa-
tion as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the 
burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminu-
tion in value of the tract as a whole"); id. at 1026 (holding that regulation "wholly elimi-
nated the value of the claimant's land"). 
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One of the grounds for the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision 
was that because there was $200,000 in value left in the property, if 
one-tenth of an acre of upland could be used for a residential lot, 
there was no categorical taking under Lucas and therefore no taking 
at all.387 The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court that the remainder value of $200,000 was not 
insignificant and that there was no categorical taking under Lucas: 
Assuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not 
evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the land-
owner is left with a token interest. This is not the situation of 
the landowner in this case, however. A regulation permitting 
a landowner to build a substantial residence on an I8-acre 
parcel does not leave the property "economically idle. "388 
Importantly, however, the Court found that the existence of this value 
in the property did not eliminate the possibility that there had been a 
taking.389 Instead, the Court remanded the case to the state court to 
determine whether there had been a taking under the factors articu-
lated in Penn Centra~ 390 stating that 
[t]he [lower] court did not err in finding that petitioner 
failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value, for it 
is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for 
construction of a residence. The claims under the Penn Cen-
tral analysis were not examined, and for this purpose the 
case should be remanded.391 
With the Court's affirmation of Lockean principles, one would 
think that it would redouble its focus on the loss of use, rather than 
mere value. As the Court noted in Lucas, Lord Coke once wrote: 
"[F]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?] "392 While some have 
~7 Palazzolo v. ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 713-157 (R.1. 2000), afl'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
S88 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1019). 
ssg Id. at 632. 
S90 [d. 
S91 [d. 
S92 505 U.S. at 1017 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST 
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND ch. 1, § 1 (!stArn. ed. 1812». 
2002] Palazollo and Private Rights 63 
interpreted "profits" to mean only raw value,393 this is not what Coke 
meant. The full citation of Coke's statement is: 
But if a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to an-
other the profits of those lands, to have and to hold to him 
and his heires, and maketh livery secundum formam chartae, 
the whole land itself doth pass; for what is the land but the 
profits thereof; for thereby vesture, herbage, trees, mines, all 
whatsoever parcel of that land, doth passe.394 
The reference to mines, herbage, and so forth clearly implies more 
than the residual value that might be left in property; it involves the 
fruits of the use of property. It would be hard to reconcile this com-
mon law tradition with the notion that the government can take the 
vesture, the mines, the herbage, and most of the trees without paying 
compensation to the owner.395 
The implications to the practitioner should be an emphasis on 
the uses of the property. If a landowner can make a strong case that 
there is no economically beneficial use remaining in the property, the 
landowner should be able to maintain an allegation that the categori-
cal per se rule of Lucas applies, whether or not some residual value 
remains. To the extent that this "value" actually reflects a remaining 
"use," the landowner should be prepared to make an argument for a 
partial taking, using perhaps the template of Chief Judge Smith's de-
cision in Florida IWck Industries, Inc. v. United States. 396 
If there are some significant uses remaining, but those uses are 
severely reduced, then a landowner should be prepared to demon-
strate the ways in which the use has been diminished through a com-
parison of the before-and-after conditions of the property. The Court 
in Palazzolo would place such an analysis under the umbrella of Penn 
Central.397 Such considerations may include a before and after com-
parison of: (1) the various uses allowed on the property; (2) the real 
393 See, e.g., KENDALL ET AL., supra note 382, at 197. This rationale was also adopted by 
the Ninth Circuit. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 
F.3d 764, 781 (9th Cir. 2000) (equating "profits" with value), reh'g denied, reh'g en banc de-
nied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), afl'd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
394 COKE, supra note 392, ch. 1, § 1. 
395 For a more extended treatment of the use versus value debate, see James Burling, 
Can the Existence of Value in Property Avert a Regulatory Taking When Economically Beneficial Use 
Has Been Destruyed?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 451 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 
2002). 
396 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999). 
397 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001). 
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extent to which the land can be used; (3) the time horizons of the 
development; (4) the changes in the market risk of development 
caused by the restrictions; and (5) any changes in fair market value. 
There is no doubt that ordinary market forces can effect each 
one of these factors. However, when a landowner can show that the 
regulatory restriction has caused a severe reduction in use and value, 
a reduction that is not caused by mere changes in the market, then 
considerations of fairness militate compensation. In other words, 
when a landowner is forced to "bear burdens, which in all justice and 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole," the landowner is 
owed compensation.398 The fact that some small value remains in the 
property is simply not a dispositive factor, if it is properly weighed in 
light of the overarching concerns that attach to rights in property. In 
other words, the loss of use, not the remainder of token value, should 
be the primary consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
Property rights and aquatic resources are not mutually exclusive 
terms. As never before, however, there is a debate between those fa-
voring an ever-increasing level of uncompensated regulation of pri-
vate property and those in favor of the protection of private property 
rights. The issue is not whether government can decree that aquatic 
resources be left in their natural state, but instead who will pay the 
costs of dedicating real property to conservation uses. In recent years, 
private property owners have been winning the debate before the 
United States Supreme Court and some federal courts. As a result, the 
advocates of the regulatory state are urging stricter ripeness stan-
dards, for a rule that notice of preexisting regulations eliminates the 
ability to bring a takings challenge when the regulation is applied, 
and that there can be no taking whenever there is any value left to the 
allegedly taken property. By taking away some of the more pernicious 
governmental defenses to regulatory takings claims in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, the United States Supreme Court has injected new life in 
the doctrine of regulatory takings. 
398 See id. at 618 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
